[conspire] 737 MAX: It is a good day to die^W fly

[Rick Moen]

Headline:  "FAA Clears Boeing's 737 Max To Resume Passenger Service"
November 18, 2020

https://www.npr.org/2020/11/18/936080917/faa-gives-boeing-ok-to-resume-737-max-passenger-service


FAA is ordering a set of 'design changes'.
https://www.faa.gov/foia/electronic_reading_room/boeing_reading_room/media/737_AD_2019-NM-035fr.pdf

It's expected that airlines running the craft are going to paint out the
'737 MAX" on the fuselages and other passenger-facing places, and
substitute the equivalent terms '737-8' and '737-9' (the series
designations for 737 MAX in two slightly different lengths)[1].  Because,
hey, it's all about branding, right?

As a reminder, the _technical_ problem with the 737 MAX series is
fundamental aerodynamic pitch instability in some operating attitudes, 
which problem was covered over by a software & sensors &
attitude-control subsystem, 'MCAS', that would intervene and point the
nose down, overriding the pilots, who were completely uninformed even
about that subsystem's existence in the first place.  And the reason 
this kludge got invented was to keep producing the obsolete,
too-low-to-the-ground 1960s 737 hull design with only incremental
changes made to appear minor so as to pretend it's unchanged and not
require a new type certification.

The aberrant activation of MCAS shortly after takeoff killed two entire
passenger jets full of people, before Boeing said 'Oh, there was
something we forgot to tell you pilots and members of the public, oopsie!'

The new FAA ruling requires:

o  New flight control computer software (basically, reflashing the 
   firmware).
o  New crew procedures and docs
o  New display system for the cockpit
o  New routing for the horizontal stabilizer trim wire (separating
   the 'arm' and control lines, so a short circuit cannot cause
   continuous trim runaway).  (Boeing is -not- being required to
   pay for this work.[2])
o  A 'system test' for the infamous cruddy Angle of Attack (AoA)
   sensors. 
o  An operational readiness flight for each airframe.

Context:  Readers will recall that FAA threw away many decades of
domestic and international credibility pimping for Boeing, even after
all the other major air-travel regulators already grounded the 737 MAX.  
After that, the other regulators politely let FAA know it was no longer
trusted, and would be ignored except as part of a joint recertification
process, called the Joint Operational Evaluation Board (JOEB), that
features regulators from Brazil, Canada, and the EU.

JOEB laid down the totally flippin' obvious to FAA, that (among other
things) this bullshit must cease of pretending that a 737 MAX is _just
like_ prior 737 series, thereby letting cheap-ass airlines evade the
need to certify pilots for the MAX (let alone have a new type rating)
and develop specific training and documentation.  JOEB said this must
include real ground and flight training in a full flight simulator --
for the first time ever.  FAA is now bobbing in the wake of JOEB on that
issue, pretending as if they hadn't buried and ignored that suggestion
for years.

Also providing adult supervision for the corrupt and incompetent FAA
oversight function, in this case, was a specially convened Technical
Advisory Board (TAB) that includes USAF, Volpe National Transportation
Systems Center (US DoT), and NASA aviation safety experts.  TAB's 
findings were politely made mandatory to FAA, too.

The cheap-ass firmware reflash will make the currently fatal MCAS
subsystem listen to inputs from _both_ AoA sensors, not just one, and
disable automatic trim if readings disagree by more than 5.5 degrees for
some period of time, curtail MCAS intervention to only _one_
activation per sensed high AoA event, not many times, and limit
magnitude of the commanded trim in hopes that the crew can continue to
control pitch using only the control column, as per normal flight.

Also, the cockpit's two sides' flight control computers will now monitor 
each other to sanity-check each other.  (Astonishingly, they didn't, 
and whichever was active could send the airframe downwards without 
the inactive one knowing or caring.)

The new cockpit display system includes a mandated 'AoA Disagree' light,
which was until now a high-profit extra feature.[3]  The new routing for
the horizontal stabilizer trim wire is a basic, obvious change that
shockingly wasn't previously done, where a problem in the airframe could
take out both wires at the same time.

There are adjustments to two of the flight checklists for non-normal
flight ('Airspeed Unreliable' and 'ALT Disagree'[4]), so that the pilots
for the first time will have a clear idea what to do if MCAS starts
taking action.  Previously, they hadn't even been told MCAS existed,
pursuant to the murderous lie that a 737 MAX is just like its
predecessors.

We here in the Moen household like checklists, especially competently
debugged ones, as part of our general approval of not dying stupidly.


The _underlying_ problem, where FAA structural changes starting a couple
of decades ago made the agency have a _way_ too cozy relationship with
manufacturers, and outsourced practically all of airframe certification
_to the manufacturers_(!) has _not_ been addressed and is slated to 
further worsen.  And of course FAA has had a series of slimy industry
buttmonkeys put in charge by the Toddler.

The current 737 MAX reforms are -- obviously -- the cheapest, most
minimal improvements FAA could approve without getting kneecapped as
incompetent and inadequate by the other JOEB countries.  JOEB met for a
nine-day review session at London's Gatwick airport in September but did
_not_ issue any public report, but instead issued its recommendations
privately to FAA's Flight Standardization Board.  Technical Advisory
Board _did_ issue a report, although curiously it was again routed
through FAA, and published by FAA today:
https://www.faa.gov/foia/electronic_reading_room/boeing_reading_room/media/737_Technical_Advisory_Board_Final_Report.pdf

Personally, I would have found a little more reassuring completely
independent proceedings and reports in both cases, because for obvious
reasons FAA cannot be trusted and should not be given the fig-leaf
courtesy cover of being the public-facing entity.  FAA should have been
given the deserved rebuke of being reported _on_ rather than reporting.

Especially given that they are still egregiously lying to cover for
Boeing.

By the way, pp. 76-77 provide an object lesson in why authors should not
try to exceed the reach of their vocabularies:

   [If obliged to disclose proprietary data,] Manufacturers could become
   hesitant to provide the FAA with fulsome design and manufacturing
                                    ^^^^^^^
   information that best supports the FAA in addressing potential unsafe
   conditions, instead seeking to provide only a bare minimum of
   information required by 14 CFR 21.3 and 121.703.

Gosh, guys.  Sadly, 'fulsome' is not a hifalutin synonym for 'full'. 
It means offensive to good taste, tactless, overzealous, excessive.

'Fulsome' doesn't mean full any more than 'enormity' means enormousness.

  From rick Tue May  4 15:49:16 2004
  Date: Tue, 4 May 2004 15:49:16 -0700
  To: kusc at kusc.org
  Subject: Arnold Bax and "enormity"

  [Kind folks at KUSC: Would you be kind enough to pass this along to
  Jim Svejda?  Thank you.]

  Dear Mr. Svejda:

  A couple of weeks ago, I was enjoying "The Record Shelf" on one of my
  local public radio stations (KALW), and you went into an engaging set of
  anecdotes about Arnold Bax.  Speaking of the initially unnamed composer,
  you made reference to the "enormity of his output".

  Oh dear.  "Enormity", you see, does not mean hugeness.  It denotes the
  quality of being greatly and infamously wicked:  You might therefore
  speak of the enormity of the Third Reich's crimes, but the word has no
  obvious application in musicology beyond, say, the works of Andrew
  Lloyd Webber.
  [...]



Grand Summary:  Somewhere, the victims of Lion Air flight 610 and
Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 lie rotating in their graves.   Stay tuned
for further victims of FAA corruption, deliberate incompetence, and 
shameless lying.

Would I now be willing to fly on a 737 MAX (excuse me, 737-8 or 737-9) 
aircraft?  Yes, I would -- but _only_ because I trust the adequacy of
JOEB's and TAB's recent babysitting.




[1] The NPR story gets these model-designations wrong, but 737-8 (aka
737 MAX 8)  and 737-9 (aka 737 MAX 9) are the correct model suffixes.

The MAX series also includes 737-7 and the ultra-stretched 737-10 that
is competition for the Airbus A321neo, but these are not yet in service.
the 737-8 incorporates a higher-density, slimline-seat sub-variant often
called the 737 MAX 200 (which is classed as a 737-8 for regulation
purposes).  The 737-8 (with its MAX 200 subvariant) are Boeing's 
best-selling product, which is why Boeing pulled out all the stops to 
bullshit the public into accepting its safety and keep down to as close
to zero as possible the cost of any fixes.


[2] This _one_ mandated change is the one that will cost
semi-significant money, the others being _really_ chump change.  The
rewiring is estimated to require up to 79 work hours and cost as much as
$10,505 per plane.  So, basically Boeing is getting a huge return for
its, um, 'facilitating' money and provision of comfortable sinecures for
ex-FAA staff.

[3] Hilariously, this new FAA report re-certifying the 737 MAX -- 
where we're to understand this is FAA's A game where they hope to be
taken seriously, claims that "The AOA DISAGREE alert is a standard
design feature on the 737 NG fleet (600/700/800/900/900ER) and was
intended to be standard for the 737 MAX, but it was instead erroneously
linked by the manufacturer to an optional AOA indicator.  This is
obvious bullshit:  Boeing deliberately reserved it on the MAX as a
high-priced premium option, making higher profits if you wanted your 
airframe to tell the pilots what's going on.  The fact that FAA is 
still telling obvious lies to cover for their buddies at Boeing tells
you everything you need to know about the current state of the agency.

Offhand, I also spot another ballsy lie on page 68:  "The 737 MAX
airplane is stable both with and without MCAS operating."  No, guys, it
isn't.  Pitch instability is the _entire reason_ for MCAS.  Seems like
the authors either assumed readers are stupid or just are shameless.


[4] ALT Disagree is a warning shown if the first officer's and captain's
altimeters disagree by more than 200 feet for more than five seconds.