[conspire] That costs extra

[Rick Moen]

Quoting Texx (texxgadget at gmail.com):

> Weve had an epidemic of regulating bodies permiting the regulated
> companies to regulate themselves.

I highlighted upthread the specific year when FAA adopted this practice
as policy.  It was overt, well documented, and widely known to be very
problematic.

> On the other hand Boeing, should be required to retrofit all the Maxs
> AT THEIR EXPENSE.

This is as good an opportunity as any for me to correct a small error I
made in the prior post.  I said Boeing 'generously allowed as how
they'll do that _plus_ they'll throw in the $2.50-cost, probably
$5,000-priced 'disagree light' as free retrofits'.  That is incorrect.
They did not offer retrofits at all.  They said the 'disagree light'
would be thrown in for free on _future_ 737 MAX airframes.

> This needs to be a near bankrupting experience for Boeing, and it
> should badly wound the stockholders.

Funny thing you should mention that.  One of my favourit people on the
Skeptic mailing list, Eleanor Schechter, observed, this morning:

  Another odd thing about all this is that Boeing stock, while hit hard,
  hasn't been hit hard enough for people to stop buying it as other people
  sell it--bargain right now, you see.  It's at $360-ish down from a
  52-week high of $440-ish, which was quite recent. For most of the last
  year, it's been hovering in the $350 up-and-down range. Right now it's
  rated a definite 'buy.'

  It seems that most investing people still think this will all go away
  and the outlook will be sunny for Boeing (which just snagged a
  $4-billion from the navy). 

  And, of course, that's the really important thing.

  So the profit-comes-first mindset is still going strong, and not only
  with the corporate biggies.

  Eleanor   


> I never thought it would happen.  Trump finally did something I agree
> with.  He grounded all Boeing Max aircraft.

The Toddler-in-Chief does not have direct authority to order persons
operating 737-8 and 737-9 aircraft to do or not do anything.  I wish
people would cease confusing The Toddler tweeting something with actual
government policy.  The Federal Aviation Authority _does_ have that
authority, and FAA Acting Administrator Daniel K. Elwell (The Toddler's
lackey) issued an FAA Emergency Order of Prohibition to that effect on
March 13th:  https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/media/Emergency_Order.pdf

(Of course, The Toddler's lackey did this because The Toddler wanted him
to, but I wish to stress the way the Federal government actually works,
which doesn't involve dementia-beset Dunning-Kruger basketcases issuing
orders to outside entities over Twitter.)

It is important to note that this was belated damage-control.  The
previous day, Tuesday the 12th, about ten major countries had _very_
prominently ignored an FAA statement endorsing 737 MAX 'airworthiness'
and grounded them totally.  And then Wednesday morning, _Canada_
grounded everything and prohibited the planes from Canadian airspace.  
Which made it pretty much official that these planes were being treated
like typhoid everywhere, and that FAA's international reputation lay in
ruins.

Doing anything _but_ lamely bobbing in Canada's wake, at that point,
would have merely made the USA look ridiculous, so doubtless someone
woke up The Toddler and said 'Sir, even though your buddy Muileneberger
keeps calling you and telling you there's no problem, FAA says it needs
to ground these while there's still hope of our being listened to again
some day.'


By the way, the Wikipedians are doing a good job keeping track of this
evolving story, and I noticed this page only after sending the prior
post:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX_groundings

I note in particular this passage:

  On March 17, 2019, The Seattle Times reported that an investigation it
  conducted raised concerns about certification of MCAS five days before
  the Ethiopian Airlines crash.  The report stated:

  o  The FAA routinely delegates a degree of safety analysis to the
     manufacturer, but some FAA insiders felt delegation of certification
     had gone too far.  Sources at the agency said they were repeatedly
     pressured to delegate to Boeing, which was under commercial pressure
     from Airbus and needed the 737 MAX to be certified quickly.

  o  MCAS failure was potentially rated incorrectly as "hazardous"
     rather than "catastrophic".  The system relied on a single sensor, an
     unusual and inappropriate design for the lower rating, and certainly
     incorrect if failure should have been rated catastrophic.

  o  By the time the 737 MAX was operational, MCAS could command
     stabilizer deflection more than four times greater than certified.
     Regulators and airlines were only informed of the greatly increased
     capability after the Lion Air crash.

  o  Safety analysis appeared to overlook that MCAS could reset itself
     and repeatedly pitch the aircraft down.

  o  MCAS was supposed to operate only in "extreme" situations, so
     "Boeing decided that 737 pilots needed no extra training on the system —
     and indeed that they didn't even need to know about it. It was not
     mentioned in their flight manuals." Minimizing pilot training was a big
     saving for aircraft customers and "a key selling point" for the 737 MAX.

Most of that duplicates/confirms points I made yesterday, but you'll
notice it adds more and additionally damning details (like that third 
bullet item, which is eyebrow-raising).  Just when you think all of the
skullduggery has been exposed to sunlight, some more emerges.

Do _not_ expect leadership from The Toddler (of all people) or the FAA.
What motivates in these situations is rich people suddenly losing money
and the prospect of future sales.