[conspire] That costs extra

[Rick Moen]

Here's the narrative Boeing Company has been feeding to the press about
the 737 MAX:  'Oh, this is just a pilot-education matter, plus we'll be
rolling out a software update to make the product more better.  Nothing
to see here.'

An entirely different picture has been emerging, but first a review of
what the 737 MAX is about.


The original 737 was an only modestly successful short-to-medium-range
jet from the middle 1960s (single-aisle, narrow body, six-across
seating) that was almost cancelled several times.  It was due to be
retired in the 2000s, and the usual process of a from-scratch
replacement code-named Boeing Y1 was underway.  This was understandable
since the 737 was only barely different from the 1950s B-707 design,
which is why its low-slung design limited the size of the engines if
they weren't to knuckle-drag on the ground, a point I'll return to.  But
then in the late 2000s a crisis happened, called the Airbus A320neo.

Jet fuel had kept getting more expensive, reaching a peak (so far) in
2008.  At two airshows in 2009 and 2010, Airbus Industries showed its
responses:  (1) a 'sharklet' wingtip device that reduced fuel burn 3.5%,
and then (2) better engines with higher fuel efficiency (thus the name
A320neo where 'neo' = new engine option), that shaved fuel another ~14%.
This was a killer advantage in the market, so Boeing needed an immediate
response.  They crafted one in a hurry by killing the Y1 program, and
frankensteining new, high-efficiency LEAP-1B turbofan engines from CFM
International, and, yes, winglets.  This rushed job, resulting in the
737 MAX series,  saved Boeing's sales to, in particular, Southwest and
American Airlines.

But some kludging was required, because the LEAP-1B was, well, bigger.
So, it was mounted a bit forward and higher on the wing than its
predecessor power plants, so that it didn't knuckle-drag.  And that in
turn threw off the airframe's handling, because test flights showed it
tended to go nose-up, risking stalls.

So, the kludge need a kludge, which was the now-famous Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).  Two little vane-like
external sensors report 'angle of attack' (AoA), and, if software judges
the AoA from _either_ sensor (can you say 'single point of failure'?) is
too steep relative to airspeed, forces the plane's nose down -- with no
notice to the pilots.

Here's where the true narrative starts departing _greatly_ from what
Boeing's been saying, because this is where the firm's sales and product
strategy under current CEO Dennis Muilenburg becomes very relevant:
Since taking charge in 2015, Muilenburg (a buddy of the
Toddler-in-Chief, readers may recall) has implemented a strategy to
further improve Boeing profitability in its workhorse commercial
aviation lines.  He introduced top-to-bottom cost-cutting, _and_ he
turned _options_ for the commercial jets into a highly lucrative profit
centre.  A leasing firm (Jackson Square Aviation) estimated that typical
Boeing narrow-body jets' composite costs now includes about 5%  just
spent on 'options', which include -- ta-da! -- safety gear.  Jackson
Square says 'options' can add between $800,000 to $2 million.

Basically, these are huge moneymakers.  (How huge?  Sorry, that's
a trade secret, Friend Citizen.)


What safety gear is deemed 'optional' and how much it adds to the price
tag is kept quite secret.  Reporters have been asking both Boeing and
dozens of airlines owning 737 MAX planes, and been stonewalled.
Moreover, it appears that this information is not even disclosed in
filings with financial regulators.  But there's a clue from the pre-MAX
737s:  Brazilian carrier Gol Airlines failed to redact this information
from a 2003 SEC filing:  https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1291733/000095012304007706/y97722a2exv10w4.txt
As it turned out, Gol paid $6,700 extra for oxygen masks for its crew,
and $11,900 for an advanced weather radar system control pane.  Asked
about this and any extra information in the current context, Gol has
refused to comment.  But, anyway, it's pretty obvious that the general
rule for all of the 'options' is:  mucho dinero.  Gold plated.  And,
it's known that two items that could have prevented MCAS from killing
confused and panicked pilots and their passengers are deemed 'options":

o  An angle of attack indicator that displays the readings of the two sensors.
o  A 'disagree light', lighting up if the sensors disagree with each other.

FAA, in certifying the 737 MAX safe in 2017, did not require either of
these options.  Today, as FAA staff scramble for cover over the matter,
it is being claimed that senior FAA officials hadn't even been aware
MCAS existed, only lower-level ones.  Further in consequence, FAA
has not required any updated pilot training for the MAX design, not even
on simulators.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/business/boeing-elaine-chao.html
Also, since 2005, FAA has been in a sense deliberately asleep at the
regulatory wheel as a matter of policy, delegating authority to airplane
manufacturers to largely 'self-certify' safety, and the 737 MAX, having
entered certification in 2012, was one of the first passenger jets
approved under this new program.


But wait, it gets worse:

The 737 being Boeing's most profitable passenger jet line, it was
extremely helpful to the sales program that critical safety features
were _not_ required by regulators, and neither was pilot training,
because the 737 MAX could be offered to budget airlines and poor
countries as a straight-up equivalent to the earlier 737 lines cranked
out all the way back to 1967.  Skip the expensive options if you want,
and no expensive pilot retraining!  It's the same, trust us!  This
was especially attractive to countries like, to name two, Indonesia and
Ethiopia that want cheap, standard jets.

Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 didn't have either
of these premium-priced safety systems necessary to compensate for failures
of the MCAS system that was required by the huge engines -- and the
pilots has absolutely no idea that the MCAS 'safety' system that was
about to kill them and their passengers _even existed_, because they'd
been lied to and told it was just a plain old 737 with no differences
requiring any training or any documentation.

And so more than 300 people died.


Boeing had in mind to make some small software changes eventually as it
slowly moseyed along after the first crash last November:  They figured
they'd eventually roll out a software update to prevent MCAS from acting
unless both AoA sensors reported trouble, and were still pondering
this when the second plane crashed.  Now, they've generously allowed
as how they'll do that _plus_ they'll throw in the $2.50-cost, probably
$5,000-priced 'disagree sensor' as free retrofits.  But not the angle of
attack indicator, because, hey, that's an extra-price option, and
Muilenberg's stock options are at stake.

In conclusion:  Go, Airbus.

-- 
Cheers,                     « Le doute n'est pas une état bien agréable, mais
Rick Moen                   l'assurance est un état ridicule. »  ("Doubt is not 
rick at linuxmafia.com         a pleasant condition, but certainty is absurd.')
McQ! (4x80)                                                       -- Voltaire