[conspire] (forw) Re: (forw) Re: [skeptic] The origin of COVID: Did people or nature open Pandora???s box at Wuhan?

Les Faby lfaby2018 at gmail.com
Tue May 25 17:30:34 PDT 2021


Oh, WHO tested the staff for antibodies? The articles I read said the
Chinese government had just reported test results that WHO accepted. I told
another friend that was so but if there is a more reliable source that says
WHO did them, I would like to update them.

On Tue, May 25, 2021, 5:24 PM Rick Moen <rick at linuxmafia.com> wrote:

> Quoting Les Faby:
>
> > It may have been a natural occurring coronavirus sent to Wuhan for
> research.
> > Perhaps It then escaped.
>
> Possible -- but this seems unlikely because cases turned up (somewhere)
> in the countryside in Hubei Province, as early as November 2019.  Dr.
> James Duehr covers this as point "4.4) The best evidence we have points
> to SARS-CoV-2 originating outside Wuhan" on page 18 of his FAQ.
>
> That's not near WIV, and (it's said to have been) outside the city of
> Wuhan.  It was, by the way, recorded on Nov. 17, 2019.
>
> https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back
>
>
>
> > Probably better to research this in an isolated lab, not in a crowded
> area.
>
> First, it's not _in_ the urban area.  Here's a picture:
>
> https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/report-says-cellphone-data-suggests-october-shutdown-wuhan-lab-experts-n1202716
>
>
> About BSL-4 (biosafety level 4) labs generally:
>
> Wuhan Institute of Virology has had a BSL-4 virology lab -- albeit only
> since 2016.  WIV technically was founded in 1956.
>
> There are a grand total of 46 BSL-4 facilities in the entire world
> (according to one online list I found, so there may be and almost
> certainly are omissions).  I'm not sure all of these study viruses, but
> probably many do:
>
>
> 1.  Virology Laboratory of the Queensland Department of Health,
>     Coopers Plains, Queensland, Aus.
>
> 2.  University of Queensland - Sir Albert Sakzewski Virus Research
>     Centre, Herston, Queensland, Aus.
>
> 3.  Australian Animal Health Laboratory, Geelong, Victoria, Aus.
>
> 4.  National High Security Laboratory, North Melbourne, Victoria, Aus.
>
> 5.  Republican Research and Practical Center for Epidemiology and
>     Microbiology, Minsk, Belarus.
>
> 6.  National Microbiology Laboratory, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
>
> 7.  Wuhan Institute of Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences,
>     Wuhan, Hubei Province, China.
>
> 8.  Biological Defense Center, Těchonín, Pardubice, Czech Republic,
>
> 9.  Laboratoire P4 Jean Mérieux, Lyon, Rhône-Alpes, France.
>
> 10. Centre International de Recherches Médicales de Franceville, Gabon.
>
> 11. Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, Germany.
>
> 12. Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine, Hamburg, Germany.
>
> 13. Friedrich Loeffler Institute on the Isle of Riems, Germany.
>     (Specialises in virology.)
>
> 14. Philipps University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany.
>
> 15. High Security Animal Disease Laboratory, Bhopal, India.
>
> 16. Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology, Hyderabad, India.
>
> 17. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, India.
>
> 18. Azienda Ospedaliera Ospedale Luigi Sacco, Milan, Lombardy, Italy.
>
> 19. Istituto Nazionale Malattie Infettive, Rome, Italy.
>
> 20. Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment
>     (RIVM), Bilthoven, Netherlands.
>
> 21. Cantacuzino Microbiological Research Institute, Bucharest, Romania.
>
> 22. "Dr. Carol Davila" Central Military Hospital, Bucharest, Romania.
>
> 23. State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology, Koltsovo,
>     Novosibirsk Oblast, Russia.
>
> 24. National Institute for Communicable Diseases, Johannesburg, SA.
>
> 25. Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease Control, Solna, Sweden.
>
> 26. Institute of Virology and Immunoprophylaxis, Mittelhäusern,
>     Switzerland.
>
> 27. High Containment Laboratory DDPS, Spiez, Switzerland.
>
> 28. Kwen-yang Laboratory Center of Disease Control, Taiwan.
>
> 29. Preventive Medical Institute of ROC Ministry of National Defense,
>     Taiwan.
>
> 30. Health Protection Agency's Centre for Infections, Colindale, UK
>
> 31. National Institute for Medical Research, London, UK.
>
> 32. Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, UK.
>
> 33. Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Porton Down, UK.
>
> 34. Health Protection Agency, Porton Down, UK.
>
> 35. CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA.
>
> 36. Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA.
>
> 37. National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, Manhattan, KS, USA.
>
> 38. Integrated Research Facility, Fort Detrick, MD, USA.
>
> 39. National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Fort
>     Detrick, MD, USA.
>
> 40. USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, MD, USA.
>
> 41. National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston, MA, USA.
>
> 42. NIAID Rocky Mountain Laboratories, Hamilton, MT, USA.
>
> 43. Galveston National Laboratory, National Biocontainment Facility,
>     Galveston, TX, USA.
>
> 44. Shope Laboratory, Galveston, TX, USA.
>
> 45. Texas Biomedical Research Institute, San Antonio, TX, USA.
>
> 46. Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services, Richmond, VA, USA.
>
>
> So, I can't say I've looked at landscape pictures of all 46, but I've
> looked at a few, and in general they're pretty isolated physically from
> surrounding urban areas.  Like, see the pictures of CDC HQ in Atlanta,
> with all of that lawn space around it.  It's not exactly in the middle
> of Peachtree Plaza.
>
> Anyway, if you want to have top virologists working at a lab, you
> probably cannot have it 50 miles from civilisation, mostly.
>
>
>
> Dr. Duehr says, if we're going to be worrying about BSL-4 labs, we
> should worry about the ones that have been going underfunded and
> unsupplied in the former Soviet Union -- like one in Kazahkstan he says
> the US government occasionally funds so it doesn't turn to developing
> bioweapons just to keep the lights on -- and new ones being constructed
> in South American and Africa.  At least, the WIV facility is thoroughly
> known and respected, including by Western scientists, and is co-managed
> by China and France.
>
> > Have researchers go through 2 week isolation before leaving. It is
> strange
> > the government won't let the WHO see their lab records.
>
> That is correct.  They have not been willing to share yet with outsiders
> WIV's raw data, safety logs, and lab records.  Also, quoting a _WSJ_
> story:
>
> "Members of the WHO-led team said Chinese counterparts had identified 92
> potential Covid-19 cases among some 76,000 people who fell sick between
> October and early December 2019, but turned down requests to share raw
> data on the larger group.  That data would help the WHO-led team
> understand why China sought to only test those 92 people for antibodies.
>
> Team members also said they asked for access to a Wuhan blood bank to
> test samples from before December 2019 for antibodies.  Chinese
> authorities declined at first, citing privacy concerns, then agreed, but
> have yet to provide that access, team members say."
>
>
> > 3 researchers were hospitalized with symptoms matching COVID right
> > before the outbreak. They were initially trying to hide the outbreak,
> > arresting a doctor reporting it.
>
> What you're talking about:  The US intelligence community issued a
> secret (and still unreleased) report some while back, that was then
> referred to yesterday in a just-released Jan. 15, 2021 [1] State
> Department fact sheet, that three WIV researchers were ill enough in
> November 2019 to be sent for hospital care.  That is provocative, but
> notably included _no_ information on what they were ill from.
>
> It's certainly provocative enough to warrant further scrutiny.  I note,
> however, that WHO researchers, on their prior visit earlier this year to
> WIV, tested all the staff there for COVID-19 antibodies and they tested
> negative.  The PRC could not have simply swappped out a bunch of
> infected staff, or the world's virologist community would have noticed,
> because, y'know, people in this field know each other across national
> boundaries.
>
> Also, three staffers in the Northern Hemisphere getting ill in November
> could have just been the flu.  Or something else entirely.
>
>
> [1] I note without comment that this was, thus, the prior Presidential
> administration's State Department speaking.
>
>
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