[conspire] Boeing, boing boing boing...

[Rick Moen]

Quoting Texx (texxgadget at gmail.com):

> I recall a thread on the 737 MAX debacle on here.

[snip series of dead-on observations]

> Boeings current problem is that they are no longer in control of the
> situation.  The FAA, having been caught in bed with Boeing, is now
> taking its time reviewing Boeings assurances of improvement.

And it's important to realise that even _that_ is being driven by
important parties looking over FAA's virtual shoulder, namely the rest
of the world's airline certification and safety agencies -- regulators
representing the EU, Brazil, China, etc.  Early on, they all made clear
to FAA that any move to recertify the 737 MAX without their participation
and concurrence would lead primarily to FAA embarrassment.

> Its refreshing to see a govt agency declining to sell out, even if for only
> one individual situation.

You give them _way_ too much credit.  They're just responding to outside
pressure (e.g., from peer regulators), not showing leadership.

> Boing keeps announcing when the plane will fly, and the FAA keeps dumping
> ice on those announcements.

My interpretation:  FAA would have gladly rubber-stamped whatever cruddy
ass-covering cheap fix Boeing wanted to get away with (reportedly just a
software patch (including polling and comparing both AoA sensors, and 
limiting the amount of stabiliser input MCAS is allowed to apply) plus a
promise that the missing safety 'options' that could have saved both
planes will be thrown in standard on _future_ deliveries, but not
retrofitted for free to existing airframes) _if_ FAA were not under
heavy and highly skeptical scrutiny from peer regulators.

If FAA announced 'Great news!  We're giving blessings on 737 MAX's
simple software fix from Boeing and recertifying patched airframes as
safe as of December 31st', but all the world's other regulators called
that bullshit, FAA would be in even more trouble, and the airlines would
find the inability to lawfully fly those airframes anywhere outside US
airspace problematic.


It's been quite a few months since I surveyed the MAX story, and reams
have been written in the interval.  I've saved some links, intending to 
comment.

As a reminder, many months ago I put my figurative money on 2nd qtr.
2020 as when Boeing would finally succeed in getting recertification.
Upon review, I'm still going with that.


https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/10/18/boeing-737-max-faa-outraged-over-test-pilot-mcas/4024504002/

  FAA asks Boeing why it hid test pilot's discovery of 'egregious' 737
  Max issues
  by Chris Woodyard
  Oct. 18, 2019

Summary:  FAA discovered in October, and was publicly embarrassed about, 
internal text messages sent by a Boeing test pilot during evaluation 
of the MAX in 2016 (via flight simulator), where the test pilot reported 
that the (simulated) plane was acting crazy with uncontroled trimming, 
and referred to this misbehaviour as 'egregious'.  Boeing wrongfully 
withheld that record from FAA until just recently, long post-disasters.


https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/18/boeing-shares-slide-on-report-faa-is-concerned-it-was-misled-about-737-max.html

Article stresses that this same Boeing test pilot who complained to a
colleague about 'egregious' 737 MAX misbehaviour by MCAS, was also the
guy who formally advised FAA in writing, afterwards, that all mention of
MCAS should be deleted from pilot manuals.


https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airline-boeing/boeing-expresses-regret-over-ex-pilots-messages-on-737-max-software-idUSKBN1WZ0MA

Boeing says it's really, really sorry about the fresh outrage mentioned
above.


https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/18/business/boeing-737-max-financial-impact/

As of mid-October, CNN Business predicts that -- surprise! -- 2019
is going to be a bad year financially for Boeing on account of the MAX.
(Well spotted, guys.  We'll make reporters of you yet.)


https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/20/boeing-survey-shows-safety-workers-felt-pressure-from-managers-report.html

Survey of Boeing reporters found that 1/3 of Boeing employees felt
'potential undue pressure' from management on the job, and many reported
problems stemming from efforts to protect aircraft safety.


https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-whistleblowers-complaint-says-737-max-safety-upgrades-were-rejected-over-cost/

Weeks after the second crash disaster, an internal Boeing whistleblower,
an engineer, filed a scathing internal ethics complaint blaming the
disasters specifically on sabotaging of safety by management.  He
cited how his engineering group's vital suggestions to fix the MAX's 
safety had been scuttled solely to keep expenses rock-bottom, and with
no concern about killing people.



https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/

_Really_ damning article detailing the multiple hapless failures
in Boeing and the FAA's 2015 work certifying MCAS and the MAX.



https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/business/boeing-737-max.html
and
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/11/769609684/safety-experts-slam-boeing-and-faa-for-design-and-approval-of-737-max-jets

New (October) report by a multiagency task force details FAA failures 
in doing the 737 MAX certification work, and _also_ severe failures 
by Boeing in giving FAA vital information.  Highlights as particularly
pernicious the recent (and ongoing) trend of delegating back to 
manufacturers most of the work required to evaluate and certify their
products.  Task force recommends staffing up the Seattle FAA office and
cutting back on the delegation.



https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/09/24/faa-boeing-737-max-plane-investigation-pilot-inspectors/2433839001/

And, actually, it turns out that the FAA inspectors tasked with
inspecting MAX safety weren't pilot-qualified for those or similar
planes, and should have been.  Also, some, who weren't certified as
flight instructors, nonetheless signed off on 'check rides' to certify
pilots to fly a variety of aircraft including the MAX.  (FAA denies
the allegation, which came from a whistleblower complaint to the Office of
Special Counsel.)


https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/business/boeing-737-max-ntsb-mcas.html

NTSB says that Boeing made totally unrealistic assumptions about 737 MAX
pilots' ability to effectively serve as a safety backstop if the MCAS
system went crazy.  (In the certification process, the known possibility 
of automated trim going crazy was explicitly handwaved away as tolerable
because, it was claimed, the pilots could be relied upon to fix the
problem within a very few seconds.)  

NTSB pointed out that pilots would be suddenly faced with a totally
confusing and chaotic situation with multiple alerts springing up out of
nowhere, which would, to put it mildly, impair effective response time.


https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-11/how-a-dumbed-down-calculation-helped-boeing-certify-737-max-jet
and 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/international-regulator-report-slams-boeing-faa-over-737-max-design-and-approval/

The previously mentioned multiagency task force chimes in on the NTSB's 
point, calling Boeing's 'Oh, the pilots will always fix that in just 
a couple of seconds' pretext unsupportable.


https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/21/boeings-737-max-troubles-deepen-taking-arilines-suppliers-with-it.html

Gosh, the outside firms that rely on the MAX to run their businesses
(such as Southwest Airlines) and those that manufacture parts for it,
are all having business problems!  Who knew?  Southwest is considering
a merger with JetBlue or getting acquired.



https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/05/07/boeing_blames_software_737_max_aoa_warning_captions/

Gosh, it turns out that the high-priced AOA Disagree indicator light 
didn't work really at all, and management knew about this in 2017 -- 
but they blame it all on outsourced software developers.



https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/05/20/737_max_flight_simulators_not_accurate_report/

Oh, and it turned out that those 737 MAX flight simulators?  They never
accurately modeled the severity of what happened if MCAS kicked in.
Oops.



https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/business/boeing-737-max-crashes.html

Oh, and, back in 2018, before the twin disters, Boeing _successfully_
lobbied Congress to strip FAA of yet more regulatory power as part of
what was called the 'F.A.A. Reauthorization Act of 2018', and make
it nearly impossible for regulators to prevail over the company in
safety disputes.  FAA would be, in essence, able to intervene after a
plane crashed 'and people are killed'.

(That actually happened, has not yet had time to have full effect, 
and nobody's yet even talking about un-doing it.  Do you feel safe,
yet?)



https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/29/boeing-tells-lawmakers-that-safety-assessments-of-737-max-fell-short.html

Hauled in front of the US Senate, Boeing executives admit that they
might have been a tiny-weeny bit lax about the crashes, and looked 
remorseful.  They're personally, deeply sorry, they say.


That was the news through the end of October, and I'm pretty sure there
hasn't been much else since Halloween, other than the recent halt to
production and firing of the CEO.