From: Taner Edis Subject: Re: Necessity of interpreting QM Message-ID: <9210102015.AA17129@lll-winken.llnl.gov> Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1992 16:13:03 EDT > The sorts of 'alternative' interpretations of QM that Taner is > talking about are often called 'philosophical', but I think this is a > bit unfair to philosophers. In a sense they are philosophical, but > very few philosophers put forward the sort of interpretations that > Taner talks about (at least in Australia they don't; perhaps it's > different in California if you're studying Applied Narcotics at the > University of Please Yourself). It's mostly rogue physicists, science > journalists and paranormalists who do so. I was explicitly discussing what "respectable" philosophy departments regularly deal with. Johns Hopkins, where I'm at, has a philosophy department that regularly offers a course on interpretations of QM -- not the loony "paraphysics" stuff (actually, I'd prefer that they'd do something useful and examine the lunatic fringe, rather than indulge in exploring questions with *absolutely no* physical consequence -- a fact conceded by the interpreters themselves). > I don't agree that interpretations are irrelevant. Irrelevant > to the physics, maybe, but not irrelevant. (Actually, I suspect that > these extra interpretation, especially the consciousness theory, may > have some experimental implications and could be proved wrong). If you > just wish to do the physics, fine. But there still remains the > question of what does all of this mean? And every physicist, when > pressed, has an opinion on this. If there is to be any relevance to physically inconsequential verbiage, it will have to be in a quasi-mythological sense. I will agree that most people exhibit a need for such impositions of "meaning," but this should not obscure the fact that these are completely arbitrary and unconstrained by any possible empirical information. My opinion, when pressed, is that I resent being bothered by garbage. I'm better off if the comment space in my QM software is not cluttered by nonsensical metaphysics. The "consciousness" theory, by the way, is also lacking in any experimental consequence -- provided that what is meant is not some paraphysics (which I actually have more respect for, they're merely unsupported, not irrelevant). If some of the Wheeler-inspired stuff is taken up, it's quickly noted that (i) they propose absolutely no difference in any formal computation, and (ii) they might come up with a vacuous statement analogous to "of course no experiment can make a distinction, you need consciousness to be able to perform an experiment in the first place!" > I suspect that many physicists would give a straightforward > realist answer: we're simply dealing with the stuff that's out there > in the physical world. Correct, and I might say much the same if I wanted to get rid of the pesky questioner. However, if inquiry is pursued further, and what is meant by "the real world" is delved into, it will be discovered that a coherent answer is hard to come by. Many physicists, and others who for cultural reasons are deluded into holding philosophy in high esteem, think of "Realism" or it's-all-in-the-mind type "Idealism" and various cousins as points of view with real, distinguishable consequences. Superficially, it seems like Realism would hold that it would not be possible to affect the "external world" by pure thought, since propositions are to take truth values independently. But would it be possible to refute Realism by any possible success in demonstrating psychokinesis, for example? No, not any more than reaching out with ones hand by conscious decision invalidates any Realist precept. Similarly, the Idealist may seem closer to a point of view where "you create your own reality," but the fact that no one has been able to vanish an onrushing train by wishing it gone need not faze such a character -- there is, after all, no postulation of any availability of control. If all this Realism etc. was innocent nonsense, I wouldn't begrudge the philosophers their fun, though I'd be curious as to how they'd justify their salaries. Furthermore, even if factually irrelevant, such metaphysical language may be functional in the manner any other mythological discourse is; far be it from me to argue that ethical arguments should be ignored, for example. But I have a suspicion that pure speculation is often harmful, and for the reason of the superficial similarities of the kind described in the previous paragraph. Metaphysics is not just innocent verbosity, but because of features of the language, it induces a false proximity between certain *factually relevant* theories. Thus the nonsensical dispute about what QM has to say about Realism (absolutely nothing) also fuels an impression that there must be something to paraphysical theories that exhibit a superficial similarity to some non-Realist points of view. Realizing that nonfactual language can be of functional importance (thus not irrelevant in a general sense) should not prevent us from recognizing that its effects can also be pernicious. In the case of QM "interpretations," I would argue that this is not merely a waste of intellectual resources, but a way of actively encouraging the paraphysicists. It is no coincidence that "interpretations" figure prominently in arguments favoring Quantum Mysticism. > Many physicists, however, say that QM couldn't possibly be true of the > physical world, because of the contradictions in it if interpreted > realistically, and so they take an instrumentalist position: QM is a > tool for prediction they say, not literally true at all. > [... about Many-Worlds] the sort of paradoxes that confront QM. This is exactly the sort of nonsense that bothers me -- arguing against a perfectly fine *mathematically consistent* theory because some fool philosophical point looks weird to the eye of a certain beholder. This dispute is about as fruitful as 4th century controversies about the nature of the Trinity. Let me unequivocally declare that the "paradoxes" of QM are about as problematic as Zeno's paradox of motion, i.e. possibly intriguing, but not leading to any inconsistencies or even any substantive questions to be resolved. This includes EPR, variations on double-slit gedanken experiments, the works. > and you'll find that virtually all the big names who were responsible > for QM had such philosophical views, and many of them wrote on the > subject. I can assure you that this is no news to me, considering that I've been complaining about these indulgences in philosophizing for years now; more often than not, they are but mystifying barriers to learn about a physical framework that is plenty difficult to start out with. Perhaps a manifestation of a desire for beautiful theorizing that for once doesn't have to be put to risk by some lowly experimentalist. Though a theorist, I am thoroughly disgusted by some features of the internal culture of theoretical physics. No wonder we're accused of being a priesthood, in that in some aspects the charge is entirely correct. > extreme instrumentalist like W.T. Stace, who held that all > interpretations of the mathematics in physics are meaningless. [...] > The maths has meaning, but only as maths, not as anything else. My objection runs deeper -- I would go so far as to say that philosophers still don't know what they're talking about when they use the word "meaning" itself. Stace's problem seems to be related to those of some of the earlier positivists, trying to construct an account of "meaning" based solely on properties of statements that are to be evaluated for such, and ignoring the all-important issue of communication. > The maths, nevertheless, happens to be a good tool for > prediction. How come? Well, when you answer this question you're > committed to an interpretation of the maths. Incorrect, barring some verbal sleight of definition that removes the distinction between interpretation and non-interpretation (like declaring the unbeliever to have religion too, just that of unbelief). Inference, in general, is a way to obtain "subjective" probabilities, that can also be applied to prediction. If it works, that itself is a factual question, and to be addressed in an inferential fashion, not by some philosophical handwaving about correspondence to some mystical Reality. To make this clearer, it should be noted that the interpretations that pure speculative philosophy provides are, without exception, pseudoexplanations that have psychological value at most. They are in the same class as explaining rain by "a rain god that is totally transcendent to our experience wanted it so." This holds as true for self-declared Realists as much as for those that love to blather endlessly about the Absolute, or Being, or anything. To sum up: "interpretations" are *physically* completely irrelevant. And even in general, I'll assert that they are a distraction at best, and an inadvertent support for paranormalist distortion more often. Taner Edis From: Jim Kutz Subject: Can quantum terms be flakeproofed? Message-ID: <9210111704.AA28559@lll-winken.llnl.gov> Date: Sun, 11 Oct 1992 10:59:26 -0400 One reads all kinds of horse manure these days from magazine writers about how a quantum event doesn't really exist until observed by a *conscious* entity. They invariably cite quantum physics as an 'authority' on this. Then they go off on some flaky 'mind over matter' tangent about how supposedly one can choose which reality to recognize,or even just shut your eyes and 'refuse delivery' on whichever aspects of reality you don't happen to like, supposedly forcing reality to conform to your expectations. Yet none of the quantum physics experiments I've read about require a *sentient* observer. Apparently the observation can be 'captured' equally well by any sort of recording instrument, such as a photographic plate or event counter. I'm thinking in particular about the classic particle-wave experiment where a beam of photons is split into two beams using a half-silvered mirror, and the two beams are then recombined on a screen to create an interference pattern, thus demonstrating the 'wavelike' nature of photons (or other kinds of particles). The interference pattern disappears whenever observers try to determine which of the two paths a given photon took. The catch is that the interference pattern *also* disappears whenever the observers set up instruments which *could* make that observation, even when nobody is actually at the eyepiece observing. As soon as the 'split' photons are rendered distinguishable by the way the apparatus is set up, the wave function 'collapses'. Secondly, I've yet to read about *any* experiment in which the mindset of the researchers had any effect whatsoever on the outcome of the experiment. In every case the researchers had the option to observe or not to observe, but they still couldn't make a random quantum event come out a certain way by means of 'filtered' observation. Nor were observers able to 'sneak a peek' and then alter the outcome by observing or not observing. The act of 'sneaking a peek' always randomnized the outcome. Even the *intent* to observe has no effect on quantum events, which are affected only by the *possibility* of an observation - regardless of whether or not an observation actually occurred. I'm trying to keep this general, but I'm thinking again of the 'split beam' of photons forming an interference pattern. If the two beams go through twin maser cavities, that doesn't change the interference pattern. OK. But if the maser cavities are gimmicked with some kind of sensor beams (or anything else that could carry away information about which path a photon took), the interference pattern disappears. What bothers me about this is that the same phenomenon would probably happen in nature if a stream of photons were were split up and recombined by some natural occurrence ( such as a naturally occurring geometry, analogous to a double-slit experiment, with some oddity capable of rendering the photons distinguishable ). Obviously, when a photon is traveling along, minding its own business, and it encounters some shiny transparent surface where it has a choice of paths, the photon doesn't get paranoid and say to itself: "Hmmm, now is this geometry a 'setup' by some sneaky physicist trying to *observe*? Or is this a natural event whose outcome will never be observed by anyone looking closely enough to catch a photon in the act of being *both* a wave and a particle at the same instant. Hmm, I'd better stay away from that patch of lichens, because they *could* record an interference pattern which just *might* become fossilized and be dug up 50,000 when those apes over there descend from the trees and evolve into physicists. A photon can never be too careful." I favor the notion that the photon could care less whether primitive humans are doing a fertility dance or performing some other ritual called 'observation'. Of course the 'orthodox' quantum mechanical answer to that puzzle is that the photon doesn't *have* to make a decision until it's 'observed'. The 'official' quantum mechanical example usually given to make quantum events more 'understandable' is Schroedinger's 'half-alive' cat. If quantum states can be indeterminate, then why not a cat? In this thought experiment, the cat is placed in a box with an automated machine. The machine detects a quantum event which has two equally probable outcomes. If the event comes out one way, the machine releases a lethal substance and kills the cat. If the quantum event comes out the other way, the machine does nothing. Supposedly the quantum event remains indeterminate (and so does the condition of the cat) until the box is opened, 'collapsing' the indeterminate probability waves into a dead cat or a live cat. (Of course the wave function collapses early if Schroedinger hears the cat scratching around in the box before it's opened. Even if Schroedinger doesn't hear the vibration, the mere fact of the smallest interaction with the outside world would be enough to collapse the wave function. Well then what determines when the outcome of a quantum event *could* be observed, for purposes of collapsing the wave function? That's already been answered, by experiments that attempt to 'sneak up' on a split beam of photons. The wave behavior collapses whenever the two halves of the split beam are coupled ( in any fashion ) to any chain of events which would have a different outcome depending on which path the photon took. So why not just *say* that, and leave the 'observer' out of it? ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Note that the term "coupled in any fashion" would include 'idler beams' and other sneaky methods of siphoning off information about the split beams of photons. Admittedly, these effects hinder any attempt to observe. But what's actually changing the outcome is not the observer per se, but rather the set of interactions which the split beam encounters. Admittedly there's something *very* strange going on when a split beam of photons is further divided into two 'signal beams' and two 'idler beams' by 'frequency divider' crystals. What's strange is that messing with the 'idler' beams can affect the 'signal beams and mess up their interference pattern, even though the two sets of beams had already parted company. OK, so that's weird. But it's not necessarily a 'quantum conspiracy' aimed at frustrating observers per se. Maybe it just *happens* that observers are the ones getting frustrated by that particular quirk of nature - and attempting to state natural law relative to their own viewpoint as observers. The supposition that "a wave function collapses only when it's observed" is not subject to experimental test. That's like saying "If a tree falls in the forest and there's no-one around to record the event, does it make a noise?" Well if "there's no-one around to record it", then it can never be observed under scientific conditions, and hence can never be a scientific fact. Ditto for quantum wave functions that supposedly only collapse when 'observed'. Most probably those waves would collapse anyway, if they encountered a similar situation *not* placed there by an 'observer'. I think this point needs to be cleared up, because flakes are having a field day with the mistaken notion that quantum reality 'deliberately' acts in such a way as to foil the objective observer. This of course then becomes the flake explanation for why paranormal events never happen around scientists - because reality supposedly becomes 'evasive' when looked at too closely. Therefore a lot of flakes believe that the key to making paranormal events happen is to *not* try and pin them down. This in turn invites charlatans to take advantage of flakes, raking in enough money to file harassment suits in defense of irrationality. Therefore I think that closing this loophole with more precise language would help restore confidence in 'objective' reality, and avoid feeding into galloping irrationality. After all, quantum reality *is* objective to the extent that all of the key phenomena are reproduceable and consistent. A guy with a pyramid on his head sees exactly the same thing as a physicist when he looks into an interferometer. - Jim Kutz (aa387@cleveland.freenet.edu) -- A Fair Witness is one who, if asked: "Is that house over there white?", answers: "Well it's white on this side." From: Taner Edis Subject: Re: Edis, physics & the 'real' world Message-ID: <9210122257.AA05725@lll-winken.llnl.gov> Date: Mon, 12 Oct 1992 18:41:38 EDT > Firstly, he seems to be taking it as read that any non-empirical > statement is not a factual statement. No. A formally factual statement can still be physically and inferentially inconsequential -- QM interpretations being prime examples. I presume it is granted that the interpretations I'm discussing, such as "Many Worlds," do not involve any possible experimentally distinguishing characteristic. If not, I suggest that an examination will quickly show that this is indeed the case. > [on "physical object realism"] > None of these theories need differ on any 'physical > consequence'. According to Taner's reasoning, they must therefore be > all 'metaphysical wastes-of-intellectual-brain-space'. Is Taner really > maintaining this?. Yes. I also maintain that when a physicist talks about "physical objects," he is functionally communicating something, independent of extra interpretations that may be associated with it. > What grounds are there for physical object realism? One > obvious ground is that physics talks about physical objects having > such-and-such properties, Again, it would be mistaken to directly connect this use of language to the interminable philosophical debate about "Reality." In any mechanics (quantum as well as classical), for example, experimental information is translated into a probability distribution over a "state space." This is basically an information-preserving transformation to a description that is convenient, and, more importantly, is not unique. The language of "electron at (x,p) in phase space" can be functionally equivalent to another form of physical description, perhaps one that is not so close to our familiar imagery of a projectile moving through the air. The question of which formalism is used and why is at least partially a factual one, answered by historical explanations (physics has no lack of archaic formalisms that can impede understanding), and convenience. > What is often considered the best argument for physical object > realism is Occam's razor, the principle of simplicity. Suppose we then > say that physical objects are the simplest explanation of what we > observe. Fair enough. But Occam's razor is not an empirical statement > with 'physical consequences'. You can't go out and test Occam's razor. > Is this also a piece of metaphysical nonsense? "Physical objects," in the metaphysical sense, would be hard pressed to explain anything. At best, it is a redundancy that can be tacked onto any function description, like the Many Worlds interpretation (which can, by the way, be added to classical physics without any problem, it's just more boring in that context). If Occam's razor is to be taken as a methodological criterion to be used in inference, i.e. in obtaining some sort of probability distribution over a function space given partial information, this is a different matter. QM interpretations are not formal statements about mathematical properties of inference, but formally factual (and redundant) theory-components. "Simplicity" in this case is a difficult concept: in general, it applies to *function descriptions* rather than functions (computational complexity is a generalized cost minimum among descriptions). Consequently, reliance on simplicity concepts alone in defining a proper inferential procedure invariably encounters severe problems of arbitrariness (essentially general forms of Goodman's paradox). A useful simplicity concept will have to be derived from a generally reparametrization-invariant (or description independent) account of inference, which is not fully available as yet. > You have no justification for believing in physical objects, any sort > of external world, the past, the existence of other people and so on. > Nothing but your own experience. The most extreme sort of solipsistic > skepticism. In an absolutist, metaphysical sense, no, I have no such justification. This does not preclude me from understanding "the past" or "other people" as elements of theoretical explanations, which are extremely useful and successful inferentially. A distaste for speculation and descriptive redundancy does not imply a functional solipsism in the least. > Your argument here is that philosophy is harmful because some of it > sounds enough like paraphysical theories to encourage the > paranormally-minded. I'll concede that I made an overgeneral statement against philosophy as a whole. On the other hand, I occasionally suggest, half-jokingly, that philosophy departments should be dismantled, and distributed among other places, such as literary criticism and theoretical computer science. I have a suspicion that it is a historical accident that keeps the "useful" philosophers (analytic and interdisciplinary scientific crowd) together with the rest. However, I still see a significant speculative tradition in philosophy that *is* instrumental in supporting pseudoscience, if often through the "philosophical" indulgences of prominent scientists themselves. > Whether or not there are contradictions in QM, the fact is that it's > presented as involving them, and you can hardly blame people for being > suspicious about it all. Presumably, with a theory that has by now been around quite a while, some people could figure out whether there are mathematical deficiencies in it or not. It happens not to be the case, particularly as far as the familiar "paradoxes" are concerned, a claim we can make without severe overstatement. > I can't also believe that you've dismissed Zeno's paradox of motion so > easily. That some interesting questions relating to Zeno's paradox can still be raised is irrelevant to the point I was trying to make -- in fact, right off the bat I can think of some problems relating to the continuum hypothesis. But in the context of classical mechanics, with a continuum already in place, there is no mathematical problem associated with the summation of the infinite series that arises. *That* is the analogy. QM interpretations do not generate a "close" but distinguishable theories, they are functionally *identical*. > This seems to be half the problem with many scientists: they don't > really know what philosophy is, or how to reason outside of their > field. I'll work on keeping scientists out of unconstrained speculation, if Campbell tries to restrain those in his field that enjoy empirically nonreferent theorizing from butting into science. > Taner talks here as though he's shown that interpretations of > 'pure, speculative philosophy' are 'pseudoexplanations'. I just want > to re-iterate my claim that he's shown no such thing, though I have a > fair bit of sympathy with his suspicions about speculative > metaphysics. I consider physically inconsequential and inferentially redundant theory-components as being pseudoexplanations. Speculative philosophy has a good deal of this going on, from QM interpretations to some quasi-theological statements. It is difficult to say more, especially as exploring some relevant concepts in computational theory is difficult without resorting to extensive display of equations. When I look back, half the words I use can be easily misinterpreted, but I can't keep this posting within reasonable bounds without such vagueness. Frustrating. > And just what does he mean by 'physically irrelevant'? That any > possible experience or 'physical' happening is consistent with the > assumption of their truth? Close enough, though considerations of "information" will have to come up if a tighter definition is desired. I'll just hope that the general idea is understandable to a degree. Otherwise, the discussion is going to explode into book length. Taner Edis "If you explain so clearly that nobody can misunderstand, somebody will." -- from my systems `fortune' program From: Taner Edis Subject: Re: Physics & Philosophy Message-ID: <9210131550.AA27118@lll-winken.llnl.gov> Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 11:20:33 EDT > I still don't agree with a lot of what Taner Edis says, and I > think he faces problems with his extreme modern positivist-type views, > his talk of 'functional roles' and his unclear explanations in terms > of information, Part of the problem may be that I don't use the usual philosophical language, at least not very well -- being in statistical and condensed matter physics, my jargon and my concerns are heavily influenced by this. I've had occasion to study some more technical aspects of the philosophy of science, for example, but I still have the impression that this area of philosophy can learn much from computer science, statistical physics and information theory (which are pretty closely connected, nowadays). Which is not to say that I didn't and can't still learn from (the more analytic brand of) philosophers. As for the extremism: I certainly have no claim to be representing the mainstream of current philosophy, and I'm not exactly bothered by being called "extreme" -- as long as it's not a device to excuse ignoring what I try to say. > Then think of all those undergraduates doing Arts, or Liberal Arts, or > Humanities or whatever it's called over there. Many of them don't care > for science or the scientific way of looking at the world. Many of > them can't think properly. And many of them are ready to embrace > pseudo-science and/or mysticism. Actually, the premeds among my students bothered me the most... It may be correct to say that philosophy departments can play a constructive role in connecting the intellectual subcultures of the technical fields and the literary/interpretive ones. Is this being done to any adequate extent? (not a rhetorical question, I just don't know) I would also like it if my original not-fully-serious comment about closing down the halls of philosophy was taken more in that spirit. I'm not about to lead a band of math-crazed physicists to picket our philosophy department any time soon. > I also hold that many important philosophical areas (especially > philosophy of mind) are really a form of theoretical science of a very > general kind, and cannot be pursued without an understanding the > relevant empirical facts, and philosophers not prepared to aquaint > themselves with the empirical data have no active place in the field. Here I agree strongly -- Dennett, for example, which was brought up in connection with the AI debate, happens to be a person whose work I also admire. Work of this nature, which at its best is a very valuable interdisciplinary synthesis, is crucial, and with the fragmented specialization of science, perhaps it is only the philosophers that can engage in this, for practical reasons. I still, however, think of Dennett as more akin to a general theoretical scientist than a speculative philosopher (the crowd that comes up with those awful "Chinese Room" variants of the zombie pseudoproblem and then procede to take it seriously...). > One thing about media-star scientists that's really been > pissing me off lately is the way this talk about 'God' is getting out > of hand. It was bad enough when Paul Davies wrote 'God and the New > Physics'. I could find little fault with Davies at this point, and his > metaphorical use of 'God', but many people jumped on his use of 'God', > and thought he was presenting some sort of support for religious > views. Interesting -- this is also one of my pet peeves. Unfortunately, I can get really worked up about this, so I won't get into my complaints about this form of physics-abuse. But I'd welcome it if Campbell initiates a debate on this issue. I'll even promise not to call philosophy "worthless scum" or anything. At least not too often... Taner Edis