From: Taner Edis Subject: Re: FTE and Michael Ruse Message-ID: <9304080020.AA05517@lll-winken.llnl.gov> Date: Wed, 7 Apr 1993 18:46:16 EDT Conceptual confusion as to the meaning of technical terms is rampant in physics, and causes no end of problems. Perhaps something of the same is true of philosophy as well; at least what I see of it would suggest that this is indeed the case. The term "metaphysics," as Ruse and the FTE use it, seems to illustrate the point. Some philosophers speak of "ontological commitments" of a theory, mentioning that no theory can ever be free of metaphysics. In a sense this is correct, every theory refers to catalog of objects, as it were. These objects are taken to *exist*, as with animals and ancestral relationships with a bush-topology in evolutionary theory, or animals and a actively interfering creative agency in creationism. However, this usage of ontology or metaphysics is impossibly broad, and fails to recognize the content in an objection to a theory that points out a reliance on metaphysical preconceptions. I am inclined to see this content as relating to the reasons for acceptance or rejection of a theory, *not* in the sense that theories in general are separable into more or less metaphysical classes. (The "supernatural" remains a meaningful term in this context, but as I've proposed before, I see this as understandable in a historical context, not an independent logical one.) In other words, the relevant issue is whether acts of faith that distort the inferential process is necessary to assign a high probability to evolutionary or creationist theories, not a non-issue of what metaphysics is contained in the structure of the theory itself. Ruse, in his statement about "a priori assumptions" suggests that evolutionary theory involves untestable propositions. Provided that we do not have a case of abysmally bad selection of words here, this is a serious accusation. It would seem to imply that there are aspects of the theory that have to be taken on faith, beyond the trivial sense of metaphysics described above; and that are derived from the logical aspects of the theory, not mere practical difficulties. It suggests that there are important statements of the theory that are not even approachable empirically. I see no reason to agree with such a position. If such an argument is to succeed, it must rest on history: demonstrating that acceptance of evolution is explainable primarily on grounds extraneous to evidence, such as the very real cultural factor of eroding traditional religious beliefs among segments of society. This is not my reading of events. I have also remarked some time ago that I am no great fan of the Ruse brand of philosophy of science, with its reliance on the centrality of vague "natural law" concepts. It is, in effect, staking out an article of faith in Laws, not seeing them as products of an inferential process. Perhaps, from this point of view, it is natural enough to see any degree confidence in evolution as involving an irreducible component of faith. In this case, I'm curious as to why Ruse has made a name for himself as a defender of evolution; with friends like this, who needs the ICR? Regarding Ruse (see his piece in "Science and Creationism," ed. A. Montagu, 1984), I see as problematic any attempt to rule creationism unscientific purely on logical grounds, be it unfalsifiability, nonreliance on lawfulness, whatever. Simply put, forms of creationism can be presented that are perfectly all right as scientific explanation proposals. "Pseudoscience" must be thought of a description of an institutional process that distorts inference, *not* as a property of an isolated theory. Demarcation criteria cannot be applied to bare theories, also a problem of Popperian philosophies of science. Taner Edis "There should be no room for question, no possibility of doubt, no opportunity for debate, no rationale whatsoever for the existence of the Institute for Creation Research" Duane T. Gish (deliberately quoted out of context by P. Kitcher in "Abusing Science," 1982)