Here's a short outline of libel/slander (i.e., defamation) law in the USA and (generally) in common-law countries. Some (e.g., UK) have moved to stricter requirements on speakers, and no doubt there are significant variations. A defamatory statement is one that injures[1] the reputation of another party, either by lowering the standing of the injured party in the community or by tending to make others refrain from associating with him/her. However, it's not just any such statement. Plaintiff must prove _four_ elements: falsity, publication, actual damages (except if alleging libel per se), and fault (constituting either actual malice -- which means either knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth -- or negligence, depending on whether defendant has a qualified privilege defence). -- 1. FALSITY: If the speaker can prove that the statement is true, it is not defamatory. -- 2. PUBLICATION: It must be made to a third party. X telling Y _alone_ that Y is a child-molester does not defame Y. Similarly, if X (above) tells only Y, and _Y_ then tells others, then X hasn't defamed Y -- because Y did the publishing. Republishing someone else's libel/slander can itself be defamatory, if the "publisher" had the knowledge and opportunity to not do so. E.g., if a caller defames someone on a KGO radio talk show, KGO is probably not liable, but would not be protected if it later replayed that segment from tape. -- 3. ACTUAL DAMAGES (INJURY): For slander, it must _actually_ have had that effect on listeners, not just potentially. That is, if you orally claim that X is a child-molester and all other tests are met, it's not defamation unless people actually believed your claim. The assumption of actual damage[1] is only assumed in certain specific cases of "slander per se" (as always, assuming the claim is untrue): -- charges that plaintiff committed a major criminal offence -- charges that plaintiff has one of certain "loathsome" contagious diseases -- charges unchasteness, adultery, or sexual misconduct -- charges disparaging plaintiff's conduct of office, trade, calling, or business being conducted at that time For libel, actual damages[1] are presumed if the statement is one one of a small number of types considered to be "libel per se" (defamation that is apparent on the face of a communication): charges of criminal activity, adultery, "contagious distemper, or dishonesty, as well as any charge which injures the plaintiff in his or her trade, business, or profession." Otherwise, actual damages must be shown by specific and unambiguous evidence of wrongful harm, which is called "libel per quod" (as opposed to "libel per se"). To be actionable, injury must be significant and provable. It is not enough that the statement was embarrassing to the subject or just inaccurate. It must involve serious reputational harm to the plaintiff, such as an injury, shame, professional disgrace, or ridicule, of the sort that has demonstrable economic consequences. Thus, there must be a showing that the statement was believed and caused reputational harm with tangible consequences. For example, if you say someone is a "deadbeat" and no one believes it, there is no provable harm. On the other hand, if you say someone is a deadbeat, and a bank declines to give that person a loan, he or she has a case against you for defamation (if the statement was untrue), because there was harm done to that person because of the statement. -- 4. FAULT. The speaker must be found in court to have failed a duty of care. Depending on whether the speaker had qualified privilege or not, the type of fault required is either "actual malice" or negligence. ACTUAL MALICE: The statement's not defamation if it's in one of a variety of situations subject to "qualified privilege" (listed iin more detail further below). Most involve speaking on matters of public or community concern, and must be made without malice. This is related to the press's 1st Amendment protection against restrictive legislation (such as libel law). The most famous case in US libel law: NY Times Company v. L.B. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), raised the barrier to defamation cases against public figures, requiring that the defendant have been guilty of "actual malice": "Actual malice" means either knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. or NEGLIGENCE: If plaintiff is _not_ a public figure and the speaker enjoys no other grounds for qualified priviledge, then the "actual malice" standard doesn't apply, but the lesser standard of negligence (or of intentionality) does: Plaintiff must prove that tne defendant acted negligently in failing to ascertain whether the statement was true or false, before making it. (Tort law doesn't require that speakers have perfect knowledge before speaking, merely that they apply reasonable diligence in avoiding harmful misstatements.) In most states, it is not defamation unless the speaker was negligent in checking his/her facts. If he/she meets an implied standard of reasonable care and was mistaken, then he/she would be not liable. Some state standards (https://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/state-law-defamation): AZ: negligence req'd., Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 315 (Ariz. 1977). CA: negligence req'd. DC: negligence req'd. FL: negligence req'd. GA: negligence req'd. IL: "reasonable ground" standard of negligence applies. Defendant is culpable if he/she either knew the publication was false or believed the publication was true but "lacked reasonable grounds for that belief". IN: actual malice req'd, even for private figures, if the disputed statements are newsworthy or involve matters of public concern. Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido's, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 130 (Ind. 2006). MA: negligence req'd. MI: negligence req'd. MO: negligence req'd., applying the standard from Federal case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. NJ: for private figures, in cases involving matters of legitimate public concern, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice. Otherwise, the minimum is negligence. NY: for private figures, in cases involving matters of legitimate public concern, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted "in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties." Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 N.Y.S.2d 196, 199 (N.Y. 1975). Otherwise, the minimum is negligence. NC: negligence req'd. OH: standard for private parties is similar to negligence, but plaintiff must also prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant "failed to act reasonably in attempting to discover the truth or falsity or defamatory character of the publication." Landsdowne v. Beacon Journal Publ'g, 512 N.E.2d 979, 984 (Ohio 1987). PA: negligence req'd. TX: negligence req'd. VA: negligence req'd., but, if substantial danger to reputation of a private figure is not apparent, the actual malice standard applies. The Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 725 (Va. 1985). WA: negligence req'd. Above summarises state standards concerning private figures as a minimal standard. For limited-purpose and general-purpose public figures, higher standards of fault apply, usually "actual malice". -- Other examples of qualified privilege are proceedings of regulatory agencies, sessions of legislatures, and governmental bodies, fair criticism in a review, statements made in the course of an employer's duties (such as an employer's communications with others as a character reference for a current or former employee), and statements made in self-defense or to warn others of harm or danger. As long as those are made without "actual malice", a defence of qualified privilege applies. -- A limited-purpose public figure is a person who voluntarily injects himself/herself or is drawn into a particular public controversy. It is not necessary to show that he/she actually achieves prominence in public debate; his/her attempts to thrust him/herself in front of the public is sufficient. For limited-purpose public figures, the actual malice standard extends only as far as defamatory statements involve matters related to the topics about which they are considered public figures. -- The statement's not defamation if it's in a situation subject to "absolute privilege". There is a list of such situations, including communications with one's spouse, and testimony in court or in legislative or executive governmental hearings. (It should be noted that you could evade slander, only to be charged with perjury.) -- Consent by the plaintiff (preferably in writing) to the statement is another defence. -- The defamatory statement must be fairly understood by listeners to be a statement of fact, rather than opinion. Opinions need not be fair to be privileged: Unfair opinions are protected by law. This distinction between allegations of fact and of opinion is a grey area that would be decided by the Court. The key question would be whether the purported opinion implies some false factual claim, e.g. "I _think_ X is a murderer." -- The statement's not defamatory if the target's reputation is already so unsavoury that no damage was done (because then plaintiff will fail to show the necessary element of actual damages). -- Defamation against a deceased person (through statements made after that person's death) is not possible: Under common law, the tort of defamation doesn't address injury to the memory of a deceased person. Survivors or descendants of the dead have no legal claim on behalf of a deceased relative's good name, nor can they collect on behalf of their own interests relative to that person's reputation. Likewise, the estate of a deceased person cannot be liable for the defamation of the dead. However, survivors, relatives, or friends of the deceased may have a cause of action to the extent that the defamation reflects on their own reputations and they have, in fact, been defamed by the statements. There are some local exceptions in a few US states, because common law was decided differently. For example, in Rhode Island there is a right of action if the deceased person was slandered or libelled in an obituary in any newspaper or on any radio or television station within three (3) months of his or her date of death. Also, Texas's libel statute (Civil Practice & Remedies Code section 73.001) and also Utah's encompasses written words that "tend to blacken the memory of the dead." However, Judge Robert Sack, author of one of the two leading treatises on libel[2], said of those two states, "successful defamation suits based on the defamation of the dead where there is no implied defamation of the living are apparently non-existent." In most US states, pending court action on a defamation claim does not survive the death of the plaintiff. However, some states are exceptions, such as Georgia, where common law has held that a pending libel action may be continued by survivors upon the death of the plaintiff (Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 13 S.E. 250, 252 (Ga. 1891)). California is another exception, where plaintiff's successor in interest or personal representative (executor) may continue a defamation lawsuit after plaintiff's death. [1] The injury must be quantifiable in terms of dollar value lost, not just "people think less of me". Damages (claims for monetary reputation value lost) fall into several categories: Compensatory aka Actual: Provable real recent loss, e.g., because you lost your job. Speculative: Provable future loss that is _likely_ to occur, e.g., because you lost business from a customer. Consequential: Money expenses that you incurred as a direct result of the libel, e.g., to hire a reputation firm to clean things up. The above three categories are collectively called "special" (or "economic") damages, damages that are capable of exact calculation because they can be, and customarily are, calculated to the dollar. _Every_ libel plaintiff is entitled to special damages, upon winning. The other major category is called "non-economic" damages, which are not always available (depending on the court), and often require that the offence meet some particular test of badness: Punitive: Money awarded simply to deter particularly bad defamation in the future. Pain and suffering, personal humiliation, shame, disgrace: What you expect. [2] "Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander, and Related Problems" (Fifth Edition), by Hon. Robert D. Sack, published April 2017 (last updated April 2021), Practising Law Institute, New York City, NY. ISBN: 978-1-4024-2850-0 2 volumes, 1,826 pages. https://www.pli.edu/catalog/publications/treatise/sack-on-defamation-libel-slander-and-related-problems The other standard treatise for US defamation law is: "Law of Defamation (2d ed., 1999-date)" by Rodney A. Smoll, Westlaw (online), ISBN: 0836613953, 2 volumes. Excellent write-up: https://web.archive.org/web/20120727233155/http://www.radford.edu/~wkovarik/class/law/1.5libel.html Nolo Press about damages: http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/damages-defamation-case.html Libel against deceased persons: http://www.rightsofwriters.com/2011/01/can-you-be-sued-for-libeling-dead-john.html Meaning of "negligence" in diverse state cases: https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1133&context=hastings_comm_ent_law_journal Basic guide to UK defamation law: http://www.urban75.org/info/libel.html