[Synopsis ]
[Description ]
[Options ]
[Configuration file ]
[Login process ]
[Authorized_keys file format ]
[ssh_known_hosts file format ]
[Files ]
[Installation ]
[Authors ]
[See also ]
sshd - secure shell daemon
sshd [-b bits] [-d ] [-f config_file]
[-g login_grace_time] [-h host_key_file] [-i ]
[-k key_gen_time] [-p port] [-q ]
Sshd (Secure Shell Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh.
Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh programs,
and provide secure encrypted communications between two
untrusted hosts over an insecure network. The programs
are intended to be as easy to install and use as possible.
Sshd is the daemon that listens for connections from
clients. It is normally started at boot time as a detached process from
%ETC%\tcpexit.cmd or
%ETC%\tcpstart.cmd or equivalent. It forks a new daemon for
each incoming connection. The forked daemons handle key
exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution,
and data exchange.
Sshd works as follows. Each host has a host-specific RSA
key (normally 1024 bits) used to identify this host. Additionally,
when the daemon starts, it generates a server
RSA key (normally 768 bits). This key is normally regenerated
every hour if it has been used, and is never stored
on disk.
Whenever a client connects to the daemon, the daemon sends
its host and server public keys to the client. The client
compares the host key against its own database to verify
that it has not changed. The client then generates a 256
bit random number. It encrypts this random number using
both the host key and the server key, and sends the
encrypted number to the server. Both sides then start to
use this random number as a session key which is used to
encrypt all further communications in the session. The
rest of the session is encrypted using a conventional
cipher. Currently, IDEA, DES, 3DES,
ARCFOUR, and TSS (a
fast home-grown algorithm) are supported. IDEA is used by
default. The client selects the encryption algorithm to be
used from those offered by the server.
Next, the server and the client enter an authentication
dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using
.rhosts authentication, .rhosts authentication combined
with RSA host authentication, RSA challenge-response
authentication, or password based authentication. Under OS/2,
it is recommended to use only RSA challenge-response
authentication since there is no user based file protection
(erverybody having access to your system could be
considered having root permissions).
Rhosts authentication is normally disabled because it is
fundamentally insecure, but it can be enabled in the server
configuration file if desired. System security is not
improved unless rshd and
rexecd are disabled (thus completely disabling
rsh access into that machine).
If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog
for preparing the session is entered. At this time the
client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty,
forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP/IP connections,
or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the
secure channel.
Finally, the client either requests a shell or execution
of a command. The sides then enter session mode. In this
mode, either side may send data at any time, and such data
is forwarded to/from the shell or command on the server
side, and the user terminal in the client side.
When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and
other connections have been closed, the server sends command
exit status to the client, and both sides exit.
Sshd can be configured using command-line options or a
configuration file. Command-line options override values
specified in the configuration file.
Sshd rereads its configuration file if it is sent the
hangup signal, SIGHUP.
Since sshd originates in the Unix environment certain "unicisms"
also surface in the OS/2 version.
- Filenames reported by verbose output,
error messages and the like use forward slashes to separate directories.
- Files use Unix line end conventions separating lines by a line feed
instead of the combination carriage return and line feed.
- The ssh programs use a number of files which usually do not exist under OS/2.
Many of them are related to the fact that Unix is a multi-user system
where many people log in from a number of different sources. The code
using these files has not been disabled for the OS/2 version of ssh as
long as the absence of these files does not have a negative impact.
- Options and functionality which make no sense under OS/2 are
disabled.
- -b bits
-
Specifies the number of bits in the server key
(default 768).
- -d
-
Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output
to the system log, and does not put itself in the
background and will
only process one connection. This option is only
intended for debugging for the server.
- -f configuration_file
-
Specifies the name of the configuration file. The
default is %ETC%/sshd_config.
- -g login_grace_time
-
Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate
themselves (default 600 seconds). If the client
fails to authenticate the user within this many
seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value
of zero indicates no limit.
- -h host_key_file
-
Specifies the file from which the host key is read
(default %ETC%/ssh_host_key).
- -i
-
Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd. Sshd
is normally not run from inetd because it needs to
generate the server key before it can respond to
the client, and this may take tens of seconds.
Clients would have to wait too long if the key was
regenerated every time. However, with small key
sizes (e.g. 512) using sshd from inetd may be feasible.
- -k key_gen_time
-
Specifies how often the server key is regenerated
(default 3600 seconds, or one hour). The motivation
for regenerating the key fairly often is that
the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an
hour, it becomes impossible to recover the key for
decrypting intercepted communications even if the
machine is cracked into or physically seized. A
value of zero indicates that the key will never be
regenerated.
- -p port
-
Specifies the port on which the server listens for
connections (default 22).
- -q
-
Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log.
Normally the beginning, authentication, and termination
of each connection is logged.
Sshd reads configuration data from %ETC%/sshd_config (or
the file specified with -f on the command line). The file
contains keyword-value pairs, one per line. Lines starting
with `#' and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
The following keywords are possible:
- AllowHosts
-
This keyword can be followed by any number of host
name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified,
login is allowed only from hosts whose name matches
one of the patterns. `*' and `?' can be used as
wildcards in the patterns. Normal name servers are
used to map the client's host into a canonical host
name. If the name cannot be mapped, its IP-address
is used as the host name. By default all hosts are
allowed to connect.
(Note that sshd can also be configured to use
tcp_wrappers using the --with-libwrap compile-time
configuration option.)
- DenyHosts
-
This keyword can be followed by any number of host
name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified,
login is disallowed from the hosts whose name
matches any of the patterns.
- FascistLogging
-
Specifies whether to use verbose logging. Verbose
logging violates the privacy of users and is not
recommended. The argument must be "yes" or "no"
(without the quotes). The default is "no".
- HostKey
-
Specifies the file containing the private host key
(default %ETC%/ssh_host_key).
- IgnoreRhosts
-
Specifies that rhosts and shosts files will not be
used in authentication. %ETC%/hosts.equiv and
%ETC%/shosts.equiv are still used. The default is
"no".
Under OS/2, this should be set to "yes".
- KeepAlive
-
Specifies whether the system should send keepalive
messages to the other side. If they are sent,
death of the connection or crash of one of the
machines will be properly noticed. However, this
means that connections will die if the route is
down temporarily, and some people find it annoying.
On the other hand, if keepalives are not send, sessions
may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving
"ghost" users and consuming server resources.
The default is "yes" (to send keepalives), and the
server will notice if the network goes down or the
client host reboots. This avoids infinitely hanging
sessions.
To disable keepalives, the value should be set to
"no" in both the server and the client configuration
files.
- KeyRegenerationInterval
-
The server key is automatically regenerated after
this many seconds (if it has been used). The purpose
of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured
sessions by later breaking into the machine
and stealing the keys. The key is never stored
anywhere. If the value is 0, the key is never
regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds).
- ListenAddress
-
Specifies the ip address of the interface where the
sshd server socket is bound to.
- LoginGraceTime
-
The server disconnects after this time if the user
has not successfully logged in. If the value is 0,
there is no time limit. The default is 600 (seconds).
- PasswordAuthentication
-
Specifies whether password authentication is
allowed. The default is "yes".
Under OS/2, this should be set to "no".
- PermitEmptyPasswords
-
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies
whether the server allows login to accounts
with empty password strings. The default is "yes".
Under OS/2, this should be set to "no".
- PermitRootLogin
-
Specifies whether the root can log in using ssh.
Under OS/2 all logins are root logins since OS/2
is a single-user operating system.
May be set to "yes", "nopwd", or "no". The default
is "yes", allowing root logins through any of the
authentication types allowed for other users. The
"nopwd" value disables password-authenticated root
logins. The "no" value disables root logins
through any of the authentication methods.
("nopwd" and "no" are equivalent unless you have a
.rhosts, .shosts, or .ssh/authorized_keys file in
the root home directory.)
Root login with RSA authentication when the "command"
option has been specified will be allowed
regardless of the value of this setting (which may
be useful for taking remote backups even if root
login is normally not allowed).
- PidFile
-
Specifies the location of the file containing the
process ID of the master sshd daemon, the default is
%ETC%/sshd.pid
- Port
Specifies the port number that sshd listens to.
The default is 22.
- PrintMotd
-
Specifies whether sshd should print %ETC%/motd when
a user logs in interactively. The default is "yes".
- QuietMode
-
Specifies whether the system runs in quiet mode.
In quiet mode, nothing is logged in the system log,
except fatal errors. The default is "no".
- RandomSeed
-
Specifies the file containing the random seed for
the server; this file is created automatically and
updated regularly. The default is %ETC%/ssh_random_seed.
- RhostsAuthentication
-
Specifies whether authentication using rhosts or
%ETC%/hosts.equiv files is sufficient. Normally,
this method should not be permitted because it is
insecure. RhostsRSAAuthentication should be used
instead, because it performs RSA-based host authentication
in addition to normal rhosts or
%ETC%/hosts.equiv authentication. The default is
"no".
- RhostsRSAAuthentication
-
Specifies whether rhosts or %ETC%/hosts.equiv
authentication together with successful RSA host
authentication is allowed. The default is "yes".
Under OS/2, this should be set to "no".
- RSAAuthentication
-
Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is
allowed. The default is "yes".
- ServerKeyBits
-
Defines the number of bits in the server key. The
minimum value is 512, and the default is 768.
- StrictModes
-
Specifies whether sshd should check file modes and
ownership of the user's home directory and rhosts
files before accepting login. Under Unix this is normally
desirable because novices sometimes accidentally
leave their directory or files world-writable, therefore
the default is "yes".
Under OS/2, however, this must be set to "no".
- SyslogFacility
-
Gives the facility code that is used when logging
messages from sshd. The possible values are: DAEMON,
USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3,
LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is
DAEMON.
- X11Forwarding
-
Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The
default is "yes". Note that disabling X11 forwarding
does not improve security in any way, as users
can always install their own forwarders.
When a user successfully logs in, sshd under OS/2 does the following:
- Sets up the basic environment.
- Reads %ETC%/environment if it exists.
- Reads %HOME%/.ssh/environment if it exists.
- Changes to user's home directory.
- If %HOME%/.ssh/rc.cmd exists, runs it
using the command interpreter specified in
the environment variable COMSPEC;
else if %ETC%/sshrc.cmd exists, runs it;
otherwise runs xauth. The "rc" files are
given the X11 authentication protocol and cookie in
standard input.
- Runs the command interpreter specified in
the environment variable COMSPEC or the command
specified with ssh.
The %HOME%/.ssh/authorized_keys file lists the RSA keys
that are permitted for RSA authentication. Each line of
the file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting
with a `#' are ignored as comments). Each line consists
of the following fields, separated by spaces: options,
bits, exponent, modulus, comment. The options field is
optional; its presence is determined by whether the line
starts with a number or not (the option field never starts
with a number). The bits, exponent, modulus and comment
fields give the RSA key; the comment field is not used for
anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify
the key).
Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred
bytes long (because of the size of the RSA key modulus).
You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the identity.pub
file and edit it.
The options (if present) consists of comma-separated
option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except
within double quotes. The following option specifications
are supported:
- from="pattern-list"
-
Specifies that in addition to RSA authentication,
the canonical name of the remote host must be present
in the comma-separated list of patterns ('*'
and `?' serve as wildcards). The list may also
contain patterns negated by prefixing them with
`!'; if the canonical host name matches a negated
pattern, the key is not accepted. The purpose of
this option is to optionally increase security: RSA
authentication by itself does not trust the network
or name servers or anything (but the key); however,
if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits
an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
This additional option makes using a stolen key
more difficult (name servers and/or routers would
have to be compromised in addition to just the
key).
- command="command"
-
Specifies that the command is executed whenever
this key is used for authentication. The command
supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. The command
is run on a pty if the connection requests a
pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. A quote
may be included in the command by quoting it with a
backslash. This option might be useful to restrict
certain RSA keys to perform just a specific operation.
An example might be a key that permits
remote backups but nothing else. Notice that the
client may specify TCP/IP and/or X11 forwardings
unless they are explicitly prohibited.
- environment="Name=value"
-
Specifies that the string is to be added to the
environment when logging in using this key. Environment
variables set this way override other
default environment values. Multiple options of
this type are permitted.
- no-port-forwarding
-
Forbids TCP/IP forwarding when this key is used for
authentication. Any port forward requests by the
client will return an error. This might be used
e.g. in connection with the command option.
- no-X11-forwarding
-
Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for
authentication. Any X11 forward requests by the
client will return an error.
- no-agent-forwarding
-
Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this
key is used for authentication.
- no-pty
-
Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a
pty will fail).
Examples
1024 33 12121...312314325 ylo@foo.bar
from="*.niksula.hut.fi,!pc.niksula.hut.fi" 1024 35 23...2334 ylo@niksula
command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding 1024 33 23...2323 backup.hut.fi
The %ETC%/ssh_known_hosts and %HOME%/.ssh/known_hosts files
contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global
file should be prepared by the admistrator (optional), and
the per-user file is maintained automatically: whenever
the user connects an unknown host its key is added to the
per-user file. The recommended way to create
%ETC%/ssh_known_hosts is to use the make-ssh-known-hosts
command.
Each line in these files contains the following fields:
hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. The fields
are separated by spaces.
Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns ('*' and
`?' act as wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched
against the canonical host name (when authenticating a
client) or against the user-supplied name (when authenticating
a server). A pattern may also be preceded by `!'
to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it
matched another pattern on the line.
Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the
host key; they can be obtained e.g. from
%ETC%/ssh_host_key.pub. The optional comment field continues
to the end of the line, and is not used.
Lines starting with `#' and empty lines are ignored as
comments.
When performing host authentication, authentication is
accepted if any matching line has the proper key. It is
thus permissible (but not recommended) to have several
lines or different host keys for the same names. This
will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from
different domains are put in the file. It is possible
that the files contain conflicting information; authentication
is accepted if valid information can be found from
either file.
Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds
of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type
in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a
script (see make-ssh-known-hosts) or by taking
%ETC%/ssh_host_key.pub and adding the host names at the
front.
Example
closenet,closenet.hut.fi,...,130.233.208.41 1024 37 159...93 closenet.hut.fi
- %ETC%/sshd_config
-
Contains configuration data for sshd.
- %ETC%/ssh_host_key
-
Contains the private part of the host key. This
file is normally created manually under OS/2 using
ssh-keygen.
This file must be protected against any access by others.
- %ETC%/ssh_host_key.pub
-
Contains the public part of the host key. This
file is normally created automatically by "make
install", but can also be created manually.
Its contents should match the private part.
This file is not really used for anything; it is
only provided for the convenience of the user so
its contents can be copied to known hosts files.
This file must be protected against write access by others.
- %ETC%/ssh_random_seed
-
This file contains a seed for the random number
generator.
This file must be protected against write access by others
- %ETC%/sshd.pid
-
Contains the process id of the sshd listening for
connections (if there are several daemons running
concurrently for different ports, this contains the
pid of the one started last). The contents of this
file are not sensitive; it can be read by others.
- %HOME%/.ssh/authorized_keys
-
Lists the RSA keys that can be used to log into the
user's account.
It is recommended that this file is not accessible by others.
The format of this file is described above.
- %ETC%/ssh_known_hosts and %HOME%/.ssh/known_hosts
-
These files are consulted when using rhosts with
RSA host authentication to check the public key of
the host. The key must be listed in one of these
files to be accepted. (The client uses the same
files to verify that the remote host is the one we
intended to connect.)
These files must be protected against write access by others.
%ETC%/ssh_known_hosts should be readable by others, and
%HOME%/.ssh/known_hosts can but need not be readable by others.
- %ETC%/nologin
-
If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone
except root log in. The contents of the file are
displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root
connections are refused. Since under OS/2 all logins
are root logins the presence of this file does not
prevent logins.
- %HOME%/.rhosts
-
This file contains host-username pairs, separated
by a space, one per line. The given user on the
corresponding host is permitted to log in without
password. The same file is used by rlogind and
rshd. Ssh differs from rlogind and rshd in that it
requires RSA host authentication in addition to
validating the host name retrieved from domain name
servers (unless compiled with the --with-rhosts
configuration option). The file must be writable
only by the user; it is recommended that it not be
accessible by others.
If is also possible to use netgroups in the file.
Either host or user name may be of the form
+@groupname to specify all hosts or all users in
the group.
- %HOME%/.shosts
-
For ssh, this file is exactly the same as for
.rhosts. However, this file is not used by rlogin
and rshd, so using this permits access using ssh
only.
- %ETC%/hosts.equiv
-
This file is used during .rhosts authentication.
In the simplest form, this file contains host
names, one per line. Users on those hosts are permitted
to log in without a password, provided they
have the same user name on both machines. The host
name may also be followed by a user name; such
users are permitted to log in as any user on this
machine (except root). Additionally, the syntax
+@group can be used to specify netgroups. Negated
entries start with `-'.
If the client host/user is successfully matched in
this file, login is automatically permitted provided
the client and server user names are the
same. Additionally, successful RSA host authentication
is normally required. This file must be
writable only by root; it is recommended that it be
world-readable.
Warning: It is almost never a good idea to use user
names in hosts.equiv. Beware that it really means
that the named user(s) can log in as anybody, which
includes bin, daemon, adm, and other accounts that
own critical binaries and directories. Using a
user name practically grants the user root access.
The only valid use for user names that I can think
of is in negative entries. Note that this warning
also applies to rsh/rlogin.
- %ETC%/shosts.equiv
-
This is processed exactly as %ETC%/hosts.equiv.
However, this file may be useful in environments
that want to run both rsh/rlogin and ssh.
- %ETC%/environment
-
This file is read into the environment at login (if
it exists). It can only contain empty lines, comment
lines (that start with `#'), and assignment
lines of the form name=value. This file is processed
in all environments (normal rsh/rlogin only
process it on AIX and potentially some other systems).
The file should be writable only by root,
and should be world-readable.
- %HOME%/.ssh/environment
-
This file is read into the environment after
%ETC%/environment. It has the same format. The
file should be writable only by the user; it need
not be readable by anyone else.
- %HOME%/.ssh/rc.cmd
-
If this file exists, it is run with the user's
shell after reading the environment files but
before starting the user's shell or command. If
X11 spoofing is in use, this will receive the
"proto cookie" pair in standard input (and DISPLAY
in environment). This must call xauth in that
case.
The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization
routines which may be needed before the
user's home directory becomes accessible; AFS is a
particular example of such an environment.
This file will probably contain some initialization
code followed by something similar to: "if read
proto cookie; then echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
| xauth -q -; fi".
If this file does not exist, %ETC%/sshrc.cmd is run, and
if that does not exist either, xauth is used to
store the cookie.
This file should be protected against any access by others.
- %ETC%/sshrc.cmd
-
Like %HOME%/.ssh/rc.cmd. This can
be used to specify machine-specific login-time initializations
globally.
This file must be protected against write access by others.
Sshd is normally started as a detached process from
X:/TCPIP/BIN/TCPSTART.CMD
or equivalent at system start.
Considerable work has been put to making sshd secure.
However, if you find a security problem, please report it
immediately to <ssh-bugs@cs.hut.fi>.
Security under OS/2
only is provided if you let nobody access your machine, neither locally
nor remote using ssh or any other means of access. Remember
that there is no user-identity based file protection and that everybody
having access to your machine can read and modify all files
which should be protected against access - including the
ssh files containing private keys and other volatile information.
Tatu Ylönen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>;
OS/2 adaptation by Hans-Michael Stahl <hmstahl@berlin.snafu.de>
Information about new releases, mailing lists, and other
related issues can be found on the ssh home page at
http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh/.
ssh,
ssh-keygen,
ssh-agent,
ssh-add,
scp,
rsh,
rexec
Last update: 19 January 1997 by hmstahl@berlin.snafu.de