[sf-lug] Hacked RHEL4/PHP4 server

Asheesh Laroia asheesh at asheesh.org
Thu May 22 09:12:51 PDT 2008

On Thu, 22 May 2008, Tom Haddon wrote:

> On Thu, 2008-05-22 at 07:56 -0700, Kristian Erik Hermansen wrote:
>> Do all of the injected html links start with a common prefix for the
>> file?  For instance "5-", like your example ?
> They all match the pattern [0-9]-(.*)phentermine(.*).html. I'm beginning
> to think the server must have been compromised after all. I am able to
> create file of the same name as one of these with a test page and see
> that it's served in place of the spam page. If I delete the page with
> rm, the spam page shows up again. If I try to delete it again, it says
> no such file.

Are you sure there's no mod_rewrite action going on?  e.g. 
http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/5100-10878_11-5068743.html discusses 
RewriteLogLevel - try doing that and going to one of the evil URLs (after 
disabling the redirect as you discussed).

Also, what if you just "grep -ri <string_in_one_of_those_html_files> /" ? 
What about "zgrep -ri <string_in_one_of_those_evil_html_files> /"?  To 
find the string, load the page up in a browser and look for something 
fairly unique.

Can you make a copy of the disk image on a different server?  And have you 
tried asking RPM (which could, I know, have had its database pwned also) 
to verify the stuff on the machine: 
http://www.redhat.com/archives/rpm-list/2002-April/msg00118.html ?

Doing these would take a lot of time, but they'd be background jobs, so 
it's only compute time.  Obviously I don't think you should spend your 
whole life cleaning up after script kiddies when it's not your job to.

> I've put in place an apache redirect for the matching file types so that 
> if anyone is going to those URLs, they'll be redirected to the main 
> site.


> At this point, I'd have to advise the non-profit per Rick's comments to
> pretty much start from scratch with this server and/or have verio clean
> up the mess...

Sounds reasonable.

Out of curiosity, which virtualization technology?

Perhaps further discussion on the list could lead us to find a setup more 
resilient against their attackers but not too onerous for them.

-- Asheesh.

So little time, so little to do.
 		-- Oscar Levant

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