<div dir="ltr"><div>The costcutting Rick describes it the typical MBA business practice.</div>When you hear me going off on MBAs, this is the braindead thinking that Im going off on.<div><br class="gmail-Apple-interchange-newline">Weve had an epidemic of regulating bodies permiting the regulated companies to regulate themselves.<div>The FAA either didnt have the manpower or the expertise to regulate Boeing so they left the fox run the henhouse.</div><div><br></div><div>Some sort of action should be taken against the FAA allowing this or we will have a repeat.</div></div><div><br></div><div>On the other hand Boeing, should be required to retrofit all the Maxs AT THEIR EXPENSE.</div><div>Until they do, the costs airlines have to pay for parking the aircraft should be sent to Boeing and those parking fees are STEEP!</div><div>The airlines are going to expect the feds to reimburse them for parking fees but the taxpayers shoundt have to pay them, Boeing should.</div><div><br></div><div>This needs to be a near bankrupting experience for Boeing, and it should badly wound the stockholders.<br></div><div>Like maybe all dividends sent to victims families instead of stockholders for several years?</div><div>Otherwise, the MBAs will continue getting people killed.</div><div>As long as stockholders get dividends when the company screws up, it makes it OK to keep screwing up.</div><div>Block the dividends and the stockholders will start firing management, and thats what REALLY needs to happen.</div><div><br></div><div>People screamed when Obama practically wiped out the GM stockholders, but it was the stockholders own fault for not firing inept management years ago.</div><div>Having GM fail and overnight adding over 50k people to the unemployement roles would have dramatically destabilized the US.</div><div><br></div><div>NPR, I think Planet Money did a great program on why nobody went to jail for the 2008 meltdown.</div><div>I recommend it.</div><div><br></div><div>I never thought it would happen. Trump finally did something I agree with. He grounded all Boeing Max aircraft.</div><div>Now if he hangs tough and doesnt "mug wump" like he did on N Korea, weak, but appropriate screws might be put to Boeing.</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Mar 24, 2019 at 12:56 AM Rick Moen <<a href="mailto:rick@linuxmafia.com">rick@linuxmafia.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Here's the narrative Boeing Company has been feeding to the press about<br>
the 737 MAX: 'Oh, this is just a pilot-education matter, plus we'll be<br>
rolling out a software update to make the product more better. Nothing<br>
to see here.'<br>
<br>
An entirely different picture has been emerging, but first a review of<br>
what the 737 MAX is about.<br>
<br>
<br>
The original 737 was an only modestly successful short-to-medium-range<br>
jet from the middle 1960s (single-aisle, narrow body, six-across<br>
seating) that was almost cancelled several times. It was due to be<br>
retired in the 2000s, and the usual process of a from-scratch<br>
replacement code-named Boeing Y1 was underway. This was understandable<br>
since the 737 was only barely different from the 1950s B-707 design,<br>
which is why its low-slung design limited the size of the engines if<br>
they weren't to knuckle-drag on the ground, a point I'll return to. But<br>
then in the late 2000s a crisis happened, called the Airbus A320neo.<br>
<br>
Jet fuel had kept getting more expensive, reaching a peak (so far) in<br>
2008. At two airshows in 2009 and 2010, Airbus Industries showed its<br>
responses: (1) a 'sharklet' wingtip device that reduced fuel burn 3.5%,<br>
and then (2) better engines with higher fuel efficiency (thus the name<br>
A320neo where 'neo' = new engine option), that shaved fuel another ~14%.<br>
This was a killer advantage in the market, so Boeing needed an immediate<br>
response. They crafted one in a hurry by killing the Y1 program, and<br>
frankensteining new, high-efficiency LEAP-1B turbofan engines from CFM<br>
International, and, yes, winglets. This rushed job, resulting in the<br>
737 MAX series, saved Boeing's sales to, in particular, Southwest and<br>
American Airlines.<br>
<br>
But some kludging was required, because the LEAP-1B was, well, bigger.<br>
So, it was mounted a bit forward and higher on the wing than its<br>
predecessor power plants, so that it didn't knuckle-drag. And that in<br>
turn threw off the airframe's handling, because test flights showed it<br>
tended to go nose-up, risking stalls.<br>
<br>
So, the kludge need a kludge, which was the now-famous Maneuvering<br>
Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). Two little vane-like<br>
external sensors report 'angle of attack' (AoA), and, if software judges<br>
the AoA from _either_ sensor (can you say 'single point of failure'?) is<br>
too steep relative to airspeed, forces the plane's nose down -- with no<br>
notice to the pilots.<br>
<br>
Here's where the true narrative starts departing _greatly_ from what<br>
Boeing's been saying, because this is where the firm's sales and product<br>
strategy under current CEO Dennis Muilenburg becomes very relevant:<br>
Since taking charge in 2015, Muilenburg (a buddy of the<br>
Toddler-in-Chief, readers may recall) has implemented a strategy to<br>
further improve Boeing profitability in its workhorse commercial<br>
aviation lines. He introduced top-to-bottom cost-cutting, _and_ he<br>
turned _options_ for the commercial jets into a highly lucrative profit<br>
centre. A leasing firm (Jackson Square Aviation) estimated that typical<br>
Boeing narrow-body jets' composite costs now includes about 5% just<br>
spent on 'options', which include -- ta-da! -- safety gear. Jackson<br>
Square says 'options' can add between $800,000 to $2 million.<br>
<br>
Basically, these are huge moneymakers. (How huge? Sorry, that's<br>
a trade secret, Friend Citizen.)<br>
<br>
<br>
What safety gear is deemed 'optional' and how much it adds to the price<br>
tag is kept quite secret. Reporters have been asking both Boeing and<br>
dozens of airlines owning 737 MAX planes, and been stonewalled.<br>
Moreover, it appears that this information is not even disclosed in<br>
filings with financial regulators. But there's a clue from the pre-MAX<br>
737s: Brazilian carrier Gol Airlines failed to redact this information<br>
from a 2003 SEC filing: <a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1291733/000095012304007706/y97722a2exv10w4.txt" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1291733/000095012304007706/y97722a2exv10w4.txt</a><br>
As it turned out, Gol paid $6,700 extra for oxygen masks for its crew,<br>
and $11,900 for an advanced weather radar system control pane. Asked<br>
about this and any extra information in the current context, Gol has<br>
refused to comment. But, anyway, it's pretty obvious that the general<br>
rule for all of the 'options' is: mucho dinero. Gold plated. And,<br>
it's known that two items that could have prevented MCAS from killing<br>
confused and panicked pilots and their passengers are deemed 'options":<br>
<br>
o An angle of attack indicator that displays the readings of the two sensors.<br>
o A 'disagree light', lighting up if the sensors disagree with each other.<br>
<br>
FAA, in certifying the 737 MAX safe in 2017, did not require either of<br>
these options. Today, as FAA staff scramble for cover over the matter,<br>
it is being claimed that senior FAA officials hadn't even been aware<br>
MCAS existed, only lower-level ones. Further in consequence, FAA<br>
has not required any updated pilot training for the MAX design, not even<br>
on simulators.<br>
<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/business/boeing-elaine-chao.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/business/boeing-elaine-chao.html</a><br>
Also, since 2005, FAA has been in a sense deliberately asleep at the<br>
regulatory wheel as a matter of policy, delegating authority to airplane<br>
manufacturers to largely 'self-certify' safety, and the 737 MAX, having<br>
entered certification in 2012, was one of the first passenger jets<br>
approved under this new program.<br>
<br>
<br>
But wait, it gets worse:<br>
<br>
The 737 being Boeing's most profitable passenger jet line, it was<br>
extremely helpful to the sales program that critical safety features<br>
were _not_ required by regulators, and neither was pilot training,<br>
because the 737 MAX could be offered to budget airlines and poor<br>
countries as a straight-up equivalent to the earlier 737 lines cranked<br>
out all the way back to 1967. Skip the expensive options if you want,<br>
and no expensive pilot retraining! It's the same, trust us! This<br>
was especially attractive to countries like, to name two, Indonesia and<br>
Ethiopia that want cheap, standard jets.<br>
<br>
Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 didn't have either<br>
of these premium-priced safety systems necessary to compensate for failures<br>
of the MCAS system that was required by the huge engines -- and the<br>
pilots has absolutely no idea that the MCAS 'safety' system that was<br>
about to kill them and their passengers _even existed_, because they'd<br>
been lied to and told it was just a plain old 737 with no differences<br>
requiring any training or any documentation.<br>
<br>
And so more than 300 people died.<br>
<br>
<br>
Boeing had in mind to make some small software changes eventually as it<br>
slowly moseyed along after the first crash last November: They figured<br>
they'd eventually roll out a software update to prevent MCAS from acting<br>
unless both AoA sensors reported trouble, and were still pondering<br>
this when the second plane crashed. Now, they've generously allowed<br>
as how they'll do that _plus_ they'll throw in the $2.50-cost, probably<br>
$5,000-priced 'disagree sensor' as free retrofits. But not the angle of<br>
attack indicator, because, hey, that's an extra-price option, and<br>
Muilenberg's stock options are at stake.<br>
<br>
In conclusion: Go, Airbus.<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Cheers, « Le doute n'est pas une état bien agréable, mais<br>
Rick Moen l'assurance est un état ridicule. » ("Doubt is not <br>
<a href="mailto:rick@linuxmafia.com" target="_blank">rick@linuxmafia.com</a> a pleasant condition, but certainty is absurd.')<br>
McQ! (4x80) -- Voltaire <br>
<br>
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</blockquote></div><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_signature"><br>R "Texx" Woodworth<br>Sysadmin, E-Postmaster, IT Molewhacker<br>"Face down, 9 edge 1st, roadkill on the information superdata highway..."<br></div>