<html><head></head><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:lucida console, sans-serif;font-size:13px"><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_5984" class="qtdSeparateBR"><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_5983" dir="ltr">This aligns with a story I heard (NPR?) a couple of years ago. The subject was some incident during the Civil War. It was commonly accepted that what happened was "A". However a history professor had researched the subject in depth and concluded "B". This was based on contemporary newspaper articles. <br></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_6087" dir="ltr"><br></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_6182" dir="ltr">He edited Wikipedia. His edits were undone. Lots of back and forth. Wikipedia had a preference for secondary sources (history books published long afterwards, but widely available) and rejected the primary source because the original newspaper articles were not available online.<br></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_6137"><br></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_6088"><br></div><br></div><div style="display: block;" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_6050" class="yahoo_quoted"> <div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_6049" style="font-family: lucida console, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_6048" style="font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif; font-size: 16px;"> <div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_6047" dir="ltr"> <font id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_6361" face="Arial" size="2"> <hr size="1"> <b><span style="font-weight:bold;">From:</span></b> Rick Moen <rick@linuxmafia.com><br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">To:</span></b> conspire@linuxmafia.com <br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Sent:</span></b> Sunday, April 16, 2017 10:43 AM<br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Subject:</span></b> [conspire] Wikipedia editing suckitude; the art of checklists<br> </font> </div> <div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1492379736868_6362" class="y_msg_container"><br>Remember: a well-debugged checklist will save your life.<br><br>----- Forwarded message from Rick Moen <<a ymailto="mailto:rick@linuxmafia.com" href="mailto:rick@linuxmafia.com">rick@linuxmafia.com</a>> -----<br><br>Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2017 23:50:49 -0700<br>From: Rick Moen <<a ymailto="mailto:rick@linuxmafia.com" href="mailto:rick@linuxmafia.com">rick@linuxmafia.com</a>><br>To: Kevin W Enns <<a ymailto="mailto:kwenns@gmail.com" href="mailto:kwenns@gmail.com">kwenns@gmail.com</a>><br>Subject: Re: [skeptic] And see, this is why he makes the big bucks...<br>Organization: If you lived here, you'd be $HOME already.<br><br>I wrote:<br><br>> BTW, the things you learn from reading NTSB disaster reports! I'd<br>> somehow assumed Dad had been a longtime captain, but the disaster report<br>> on the crash that killed him in December 1968 said he'd been rated for<br>> full captain status only in June 1967, in the middle of our stay in<br>> Victoria, Hong Kong.<br><br>Around the time I was writing that, I was doing a low-key corrective<br>edit of this Wikipedia passage:<br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elmendorf_Air_Force_Base#Aviation_accidents" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elmendorf_Air_Force_Base#Aviation_accidents</a><br><br>Over the years, there have been several mentions on Wikipedia of the Pan<br>Am flight 799 disaster that killed my father, and they've all had the<br>same appalling problem: The clumsy editing and writing always ends up <br>blaming the pilots: The Wikipedians always boil it down to 'Crew<br>attempted a no-flaps takeoff', which makes them sound like a trio of<br>idiots who incompetently killed themselves and a $5M airframe.<br><br>And they do this while linking directly to the NTSB report, which means<br>they _don't fscking read it_. The report goes out of its way to say it<br>wasn't the pilots' fault.[1]<br><br>This is a sore point with me and with anyone who grew up in an airline<br>family, because it's notorious that the airline, the airframe<br>manufacturer, and even the press tends to _immediately_ jump the gun<br>after almost any fatal air crash and _blame the pilots_. 'Must have been<br>pilot error', we hear. Why _not_ blame them? They're dead and can't sue,<br>so who cares if everyone casually defames them?<br><br>_So_ tired of that.<br><br>I have to be extremely low-key about my Wikipedia editing, though,<br>because if my personal connection is known or suspected, there could be<br>a huge backlash. The justification for this is their mania for NPOV<br>(neutral point of view), but functionally (IMO) it's hauled out by<br>Wikipedia regulars mostly as a passive-aggressive way to fend off<br>non-regulars with inconvenient expertise.<br><br>So, I edit without logging in, and try hard not to get the regulars'<br>backs up.<br><br>Around late 2004, a Wikipedia article about my friend Eric S. Raymond,<br>a rather flamboyant (and, to be fair, self-promoting) member of the open<br>source community, had been turned into a rather appalling hatchet job<br>pretty much devoted to attacking him personally, citing as the 'neutral'<br>source an extremely dubious, scurrilous free-hosted Web page<br>(<a href="http://esr.1accesshost.com/" target="_blank">http://esr.1accesshost.com/</a>) that for some years had been maintained<br> by anonymous parties who dislike Eric in order to ridicule<br>him. Eric made the mistake of directly attempting to edit and correct<br>the Wikipedia page under his own name as the editing login -- and<br>immediately ran into a buzzsaw of Wikipedians saying he was not allowed<br>to make the article cease sucking, because he wasn't 'neutral'. So, his<br>edits were reverted(!), even though he amply explained them. At that<br>time, in particular, the Wikipedians would rather reject corrections<br>from an expert and keep a terrible page if the expert knew too much<br>because, y'know, nobody knows more about that particular subject, being<br>a primary source, but isn't 'neutral' so we mustn't listen.<br><br>I drew the appropriate lessons, and, not long afterwards when someone<br>created a page about me, rather than try to improve it, I invoked <br>Wikipedia's non-urgent process for deleting the page, which got done<br>about a month later.<br><br>Ironically, what ended use of the <a href="http://esr.1accesshost.com/" target="_blank">http://esr.1accesshost.com/ </a>page as a<br>primary source was it being cited by one of its proponents, one Jim<br>Thompson, on my 'Conspire' Linux user group mailing list in California,<br>in reply to which I debunked the factual claims cited from that page,<br>even to Thompson's satisfaction. Afterwards, Wikipedians were able to<br>reference my mailing list discussion as a reliable external authority to<br>fix the page about Eric. So, they were willing to accept better<br>information about Eric from me, but not from Eric. Weird.<br><br>(Since that time, Wikipedia has mostly cleaned up its act, getting<br>serious about enforcing its Biography of Living Persons policy and<br>disallowing use of Wikipedia for personal hatchet jobs.)<br><br><br>There is also at least one other Wikipedia page that includes the Pan Am<br>crash, that I _also_ had to delicately fix some years ago -- same<br>serious problem -- but I can't find it at the moment.<br><br><br>Here's a weird thing:<br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accidents_and_incidents_involving_the_Boeing_707#1960s" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accidents_and_incidents_involving_the_Boeing_707#1960s</a><br>and<br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accidents_and_incidents_involving_commercial_aircraft#1968" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accidents_and_incidents_involving_commercial_aircraft#1968</a><br>have nothing about the crash. Can you guess why?<br><br>It's because _even though_ those purport to be comprehensive lists, no<br>additions are permitted (to flesh out the lists) unless each links to <br>a full Wikipedia page about the disaster. Because nobody has yet made a<br>page about Pan Am flight 799, it remains nearly absent.<br><br>Of course, I _could_ create a<br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_799" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_799 </a>page from scratch and <br>make it scrupulously match the NTSB report and several classic books <br>that extensively cover it as a key case study. I'm almost willing to try.<br>That would be a fairly high-profile edit, however, and might attract<br>attention. (Articles that are too substantive also start getting<br>complaints about violations of the 'No original research' rule, even if<br>scrupulously referenced.)<br><br><br><br>[1] Among the many things you'll never learn from the lamentably bad<br>discussion of this crash most places on the Web (including Wikipedia) is<br>that the flight 799 disaster (eventually) brought about a revolution in<br>human-factors research for both the airline industry and others, and<br>forced rethinking about the way checklists are used. In a real way, the<br>sad lessons learned from studying this crash have saved countless lives<br>(later). (But it took more checklist-related deaths and 18 more years<br>before NTSB prompted FAA to convene a research group to improve<br>checklist design.) <br>See: <a href="https://ti.arc.nasa.gov/m/profile/adegani/Cockpit%20Checklists.pdf" target="_blank">https://ti.arc.nasa.gov/m/profile/adegani/Cockpit%20Checklists.pdf</a><br><a href="http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/Northwest255/Review%20of%20Takeoff%20Configuration%20Warning%20Systems%20on%20Large%20Jet%20Transports.pdf" target="_blank">http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/Northwest255/Review%20of%20Takeoff%20Configuration%20Warning%20Systems%20on%20Large%20Jet%20Transports.pdf</a><br><br>In its mid-1969 report on the crash, NTSB identified as critical<br>causative factors (a) a fatal flaw in the preflight checklists that<br>interacted catastrophically with (b) an unfixed hardware defect in a<br>crucial warning system. The warning system was a horn designed to sound<br>if the pilots apply takeoff thrust and any of several control structures<br>including the flaps aren't set right for takeoff.<br><br>First Officer Johannes Markestein, following the taxi phase of the<br>checklist as they rolled away from the gate, lowered (set) the flaps to<br>the correct 14 degrees for takeoff. (There are separate checklists for<br>each successive phase of takeoff: 'BEFORE START' at the closing of the<br>passenger doors, 'TAXI' after receiving the taxi clearance, 'BEFORE<br>TAKEOFF' to be completed by reaching the hold line before the runway,<br>etc.) However, then Captain Arthur Moen, following verbatim requirements<br>of the cold weather operations section of the Pan Am aircraft operations<br>manual, which says flaps in cold weather conditions (like Anchorage, AK<br>in late December at 6am) should be left _up_ (retracted) until lineup<br>for takeoff, in order to reduce the chance of snow or ice wedging the<br>flap screws into extended position or lodge between the flap and the<br>wing edge, did so.<br><br>Captain Moen immediately discussed his having done so with Markestein.<br>Markestein replied 'OK, let's not forget them.' But there was no<br>post-taxi checklist item to -recheck- flaps before takeoff. The<br>checklists in use made the brittle, often-untrue assumption that there<br>would have been no reason to touch the flaps after setting them to 14<br>degrees after taxi phase. In fact, as NTSB pointed out in a subsequent<br>special report, the checklists' assumptions were easily invalidated by<br>any number of unplanned events or interruptions as the crew runs through<br>them.<br><br>And this is where the poorly debugged checklists interacted<br>catastrophically with the jet's hardware defect. This was the 'takeoff<br>warning system', which is intended to sound a loud horn if pilots apply<br>takeoff thrust with either flaps, speed brakes, or the stabilizer<br>(vertical tail) in the wrong position for takeoff. As this was in<br>the primitive era of electronics, application of takeoff thrust was<br>detected by a mechanical linkage to the thrust lever. If it were<br>advanced to 42 degrees of angle, then the checks of those three systems<br>would be triggered and a horn go off if they weren't set right. <br><br>And this is where there's a subtle physics problem. Boeing had done<br>testing two years before, and found that if the ambient air were really<br>cold -- like Anchorage, AK in late December at 6:15 am -- triggering<br>wouldn't occur, and sent out a bulletin recommending that the actuator<br>be changed from 42 degrees to 25 degrees. <br><br>And why would cold weather cause this? (My surmise:) Because cold air<br>is denser, and provides more lift, hence you get takeoff thrust without<br>the thrust lever being pushed as far forward. Boeing didn't indicate<br>any special urgency, and completely failed to define what it meant when<br>it said this would be a problem in 'cold weather operations'.<br><br>It was about 1 degree F, that day in December, 1968.<br><br>For its part, Pan Am decided to not bother implementing the recommended<br>fix even though it would have cost less than $50 per plane: Some<br>unnamed engineer in Pan Am service engineering 'decided the modification<br>was not necessary'. An equally unnamed supervisor reviewed this<br>decision and 'decided, after coordination with flight operations, that<br>the bulletin was not applicable to Pan Am aircraft, and no further<br>action was taken. The reason for this decision was not fully<br>documented.' Great job, guys!<br><br>So, First Officer Markestein had said 'OK, let's not forget them', but<br>they were following procedure by working scrupulously through the<br>checklists, and nothing there said anything about the flaps. The flight<br>was cleared for takeoff, and Markestein applied takeoff thrust --<br>advancing the thrust lever, but not to 42 degrees on account of the cold<br>air. They rose, but started having trouble maintaining attitude control<br>and remaining above stall speed. Doubtless they started working through<br>the emergency checklists, which unfortunately were written with the<br>assumption that the takeoff warning system was functional. And, problem<br>is, the crew didn't have enough time to uncover the broken-checklists<br>problem. They had exactly 59.2 seconds before the plane hit the ground<br>at 187 knots (215 MPH). The broken checklists and the broken warning<br>system conspired against them, and they didn't find the problem in time.<br><br>And all of that gets boiled down by Wikipedians to 'Crew attempted<br>a no-flaps takeoff'.<br><br>_So_ tired of that.<br><br>(I have a running gag with Deirdre every time we fly together, whereby<br>one of us needs to check out the window before takeoff to ensure 14<br>degrees flaps.)<br><br>I need a drink after writing that.<br><br><br>----- End forwarded message -----<br><br>_______________________________________________<br>conspire mailing list<br><a ymailto="mailto:conspire@linuxmafia.com" href="mailto:conspire@linuxmafia.com">conspire@linuxmafia.com</a><br><a href="http://linuxmafia.com/mailman/listinfo/conspire" target="_blank">http://linuxmafia.com/mailman/listinfo/conspire</a><br><br><br></div> </div> </div> </div></div></body></html>