[conspire] 737 MAX recap/timeline

[Rick Moen]

Where we've been; where we are.

It's been about three months since I covered the 737 MAX story.  So,
a summary (with '->' on items of particular interest):


January 17, 1967:  Boeing rolls out the first 737 as a two-engine,
single-aisle, narrow-body 'commuter' jet for short/medium distances.
Its chassis and thus also wings are particularly low to the ground to
facilitate cargo access.  

1984+: Newer 737 models switch from old-school turbojet engines to 
turbofan engines, gaining better fuel economy and longer range.  This
second generation (737-300, 737-400, 737-500) is retroactively dubbed
'737 Classic' in later years.  Problematically, the engines are much
thicker, hence needing more vertical clearance.  Boeing starts moving
the engine mounts up and forward.  Each new 737 generation lengthens
('stretches') the fuselage to add more seating, but throwing off
handling more and more.  Each is Boeing's top-selling product in each
decade.

1997: The 737NG (737-600, 737-700) series gets an even fatter turbofan,
heightening the clearance problem so much that the engine have to have
components moved to the sides and the housing flattened on the bottom,
looking like a flat tire from the front:
https://www.quora.com/Why-are-the-engines-of-the-original-Boeing-737-so-small
Because engine location causes the jet to be at risk of going nose-up
and stalling, Boeing first introduces two Angle of Attack (AoA) vanes
(very like weathervanes) on either side of the nose, to judge whether
angle is too steep relative to airspeed.

Throughout the long history of the 1967 737 design, Boeing's sales
strategy is to stress the ability to cheaply transition from 737 to 737
Classic to 737NG to 737 MAX, without the need for expensive pilot
training and making engineering changes appear minimal so as to avoid
costly recertification.

2003:  In an SEC filing, Brazilian airline Gol Linhas Aereas
Inteligentes SA slips, by revealing that it had paid over $500,000 in
optional extras for new Boeing jets, including $18,400 for floor-mounted
emergency path lighting, $6,700 for oxygen masks with smoke goggles for
the pilots and $37,800 for passenger chemical oxygen generators.  This
is a slip because Boeing puts all such information under NDA.

2005: Under Dubya's appointee, FAA starts increasingly letting airframe
manufacturers 'self-certify' airworthiness.  The later 737 MAX is the
first passenger jet to start certification under this new regime, amid
widespread warnings within and outside the FAA of the practice being
deeply problematic and risking catastrophe.  Critics are especially
alarmed by a too-cozy relationship between FAA and Boeing.

->  2007-2011:  Boeing Y1 Project aims to develop a from-scrach
replacement for the entire 737 line, fixing the 737's nagging design
problems in numerous ways including switching to an elliptical composite
airframe and cancelling the 737 program.  This is badly needed, as the
1967 basic design is obviously obsolete.  But Y1 is nonetheless
abruptly cancelled in 2011 and the 737 MAX quickly rolled out instead,
because...

->  2011+: Airbus A320neo (new engine option) arrives as a hugely
challenging competitor, because of its _15% fuel savings_ from the
improved engine and wingtip 'sharklets', at a time jet fuel cost had hit
historic highs.

2015 Dennis Muilenburg becomes Boeing's new CEO, and strongly stresses
top-to-bottom cost-cutting, turning product options including safety
mechanisms into high-cost extras.  

->  2016:  In response to A320neo, 737 MAX (737-800 and 737-900) sports
even thicker 'LEAP-1B" engines, even further forward and mounted on
raised pylons, which further worsens handling.  Sharklets are also
added.  This time, the nose landing gear is made a few inches longer to
prevent engines knuckle-dragging.  It also introduces a software-driven
pilot-override system called Maneuver Characteristics Augmentation
System (MCAS) that attempts to use the AoA sensors to detect dangerous
nose-up conditions and strongly force the nose down, repeatedly if the
software so decides.  MCAS activates if either of the two AoA sensors
claims an excessive angle; there is no validation between the two.
Also, silently going against 50 years of convention, the 'yoke jerk'
action, where a hard pull on the controls always disabled all automated
assists, now does nothing -- but the pilots aren't informed of this
change, and there is nothing in the manuals about it.

Boeing decides pretty much unilaterally that pilots don't need training
on any of these differences (even though they do, and everyone's lives
are at stake).  Minimising pilot training makes the product more
appealing.  Meanwhile, MCAS ends up applying four times as much
stabliser deflection as the certification states.  (Regulators and
airlines are informed of this anomalyonly after the Lion Air crash.)
Boeing also re-rates the possibility of MCAS failure as merely
'hazardous' rather than 'catastrophic', reducing scrutiny.

->  2017:  Shortly after 737 MAX enters service, Boeing engineers figure
out that AoA Disagree silently fails to function unless the jet also has
a second extra-cost safety option, the AoA Indicator gauge, that is
purchased by only 20% of customers.  In an internal review by 'multiple
company subject matter experts', Boeing finds absence of that extra-cost
feature actually functioning 'did not adversely impact airplane safety
or operation', and therefore it'll be acceptable to defer de-linking the
two options until a later software update.  Boeing says nothing about
this to airlines or to regulators, for over a year, until after the Lion
Air crash.  Boeing asserts that its senior management are unaware of
this issue until after that crash.

In reaching a sales agreement with United Airlines for 100 737 MAX jets,
Boeing tells United Airlines a different thing that is totally untrue:
that AoA Disagree and AoA Indicator are offered only as a package deal.
Based on that claim, United declines both extra-cost options.

October 29, 2018:  Lion Air Flight 610, a 737 MAX 8, crashes into the
Java Sea near Jakarta 13 minutes after takeoff, killing all 189 aboard.
Flight data show it made a sudden, sharp dive.  Pilots had disabled
MCAS after encountering severe pitch oscillations, and attempted to apply
manual trim, while also getting permission to return to the departure
airport, but reported inability to manually correct trim.  1 minute
and 49 seconds later, the plane strikes the ocean.

November 6, 2018:  Boeing publishes an Operations Manual Bulletin,
alerting 737 MAX pilots for the first time to the existence and actions
of MCAS, and instructing them to follow a new 'non-normal checklist' to
correct any uncontrolled horizontal-stabiliser movements caused by MCAS
malfunction.  The checklist consists of:  on the centre console, flip the
Autopilot Trim Cutout to the STAB TRIM CUTOUT position to prevent MCAS
from re-engaging for the next five seconds, then quickly also set the
Stabilizer Trim Cutout switch to STAB TRIM CUTOUT position, to de-power
the electric trim motor, and then use the manual trim wheel to re-adjust
the horizontal stabiliser, as a brute-force correction method.

Around this time, Boeing privately informs Southwest Airlines, the
largest 737 MAX operator, of the unintended linkage between the two AoA
optional extras, and Southwest retroactively adds AoA Indicator
to all its 737 MAX aircraft, so that the existing AoA Disagree 
function will finally work.

Also around this time, Boeing allows as how AoA Disagree will be thrown
in as standard equipment on _future_ 737 MAX planes, but offers nothing
for existing craft.  Also, they say nothing about retrofitting AoA
Indicator on the estimated 80% of craft where that was omitted:  It
later turns out that without _both_ being present, AoA Disagree silently
fails to work.  (It should be also noted that neither of these
improvements would saves Lion Air, given that its pilots hadn't even
been informed of MCAS at all.  And this failure to inform pilots was part
of the 737 low-ball marketing strategy, always pitching newer models as
in so similar to prior ones as to necessitate zero further training or
certification.)

An anonymous airline insider later discloses that Boeing's asking price
for the AoA Disagree option is $80,000.

November 7, 2018:  FAA publishes an Emergency Airworthiness Directive
for all 737 MAX 8 craft, alerting crew to procedures to deal with
runaway horizontal-stabiliser trim that can result from erroneous AoA
input.  FAA commences ordering a software update, but this move is then
critically delayed by the subsequent Trump government shutdown.

Pilot associations serving American Airlines and Southwest Airlines 
smell a rat, and raise a large public fuss over most 737 MAX pilots not
having been told about the problem, and, worse, no fix to the 737 MAX
flight crew operations manual (FCOM).  Zero immediate result.

November 18, 2018:  Wall Street Journal breaks a story from the
Indonesian NTSC that the Lion Air plane had registered erroneous data
from one of its AoA sensors, and that there is a known problem with the
737 MAX in which the anti-stall MCAS software can push the nose down so
sharply in response to AoA data that pilots cannot pull it back up.  WSJ
says that Lion Air crew members hadn't been briefed about this problem,
or even been made aware of MCAS at all.  Only Boeing's most recent
statements, after the Lion Air crash, advised any crew of MCAS's
existence and about a procedure to recover in the case of incorrect AoA
input.

WSJ also conveys that Boeing has 'decided against disclosing more
details to cockpit crews due to concerns about inundating average pilots
with too much information'.

November 27, 2018: Boeing holds a meeting with an angry, tense group
of American Airlines pilots representing the pilots' union, assuring
them that the AoA Disagree light will always notify them of problems
_even before takeoff_.  (This is a probable lie, or at least a careless
erorr, since it would be trivial to check..)

December, 2018:  Boeing convenes a Safety Review Board to consider
whether the non-functional AoA Disagree light on planes lacking AoA
Indicator are a safety threat, finds 'low risk', and so advises FAA.
'Low risk' as a category permits the plane to continue relying on data
from a single AoA vane without cross-checking the other vane.

December 6, 2018:  FAA updates its Nov. 7th airworthiness directive to
also cover 737 MAX 9 craft (same as 737 MAX 8 except slightly longer).

December 22, 2018:  Lion Air states that Boeing's response to the crash
has been totally inadequate, and cancels $22 billion in pending orders
with Boeing.

December 22, 2018 to January 25, 2019 (35 days):  The Trump Federal
government shutdown delays FAA action to approve & push out a software
update to fix the MCAS problem.  (FAA officials then deny the shutdown
had any effect.  This is very likely a lie.)

March 10, 2019: Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, another 737 MAX 8,
crashes, 6 minutes after takeoff, killing all 157 aboard.  The crash
occurs even though the pilots carefully follow the 'non-normal
checklist' to correct for MCAS malfunction.  In a stunning rebuke,
Ethiopian authorites refuse to hand over the black boxes to American
authorities, and instead hand them to French authorities.  NTSB sends
three investigators to help French authorities.  Ethiopian authorities'
preliminary data then suggests it was physically impossible for the
pilots to correct trim manually at the high speed induced by MCAS.
(Force required for trim rises as the _square_ of airspeed.)  Critics,
however, note that the pilots never cut back from takeoff throttle,
worsening the force-application problem.  Also, just before crash, the
pilots turned MCAS back on, perhaps as a desperation measure to regain
electrical assist, but MCAS immediately did the wrong thing again, and
dove the craft into the ground at 500 MPH.

Boeing reiterates its 'full confidence' in 737 MAX safety.  Throughout
this period, Boeing keeps repeating its party line that the Lion Air and
Ethiopian Air pilots _could_ have recovered control by just switching off
MCAS, but either didn't know how to disengage MCAS or did so too late
(i.e., the vendor-traditional 'blame the pilots' response).  This
narrative became increasingly untenable as evidence accumulates that
both crews exactly following the emergency checklist, by the book, and
failed anyway.

March 11, 2019:  China grounds all 737 MAX planes and bans them from
Chinese airspace, the first of many countries to do so.  Indonesia
quickly follows.  Then India, Indonesia (obviously), New Zealand,
Malaysia, Australia, and Mongolia.  Also the national airlines of
Argentina, Mexico, Cayman Islands, Ethiopia, Brazil, Mongolia, and
Morocco, along with some smaller airlines.

March 12, 2019:  Labour organisers at Association of Professional Flight
Attendants (APFA) advise flight attendant at American Airlines, the 
largest 737 MAX customer, that they have the right to refuse work on 
737 MAX flights pending comprehensive investigation.

More countries' groundings follow:  France, Germany, UK, Iceland, Italy,
and then the EU as a whole close their airspace to 737 MAX planes.
Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Turkey, South Korea,
Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands do the same.  More airlines ground
their 737 MAX fleets.

FAA issues a 'Continued Airworthiness Notification' for the 737 MAX,
claiming there are 'no systemic performance issues' that could justify
grounding it, and has 'no basis to order grounding the aircraft'.
Basically nobody believes FAA -- a first:  FAA's global credibility has
been suddenly and bracingly blown.  

Later, Trump appointee and former lobbyist Daniel K. Elwell, Acting FAA
Administrator, lamely justifes FAA's now-infamous Continued
Airworthiness Notification by claiming that 'new information from the
wreckage' in Ethiopia warranted further investigation before action.  No
such 'new information' ever emerges, and nobody believes FAA on that
howler, either.

Elwell's boss is corrupt swamp monster Elaine Chao, Transportation
Secretary, former henchman for Heritage Foundation plutocrats, and
spouse of Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell.  She of course does
nothing.

Elwell himself is best known at FAA for having tackled deregulation by 
defining professional ethics to be inapplicable to many positions at
FAA.  Take that, red tape!

Muilenberg telephones his buddy Trump to personally express confidence
in the 737 MAX's safety and plead that it not be grounded.

March 13:  Following groundings by Vietnam, New Zealand, Brazil,
Columbia, Chile, and Mexico, Canadian authorities join almost all other
aviation authorities in grounding all 737 MAX planes and banning them
from Canadian airspace.   (This makes many flights in and out of the USA
impractical, given flight paths.)  

Muilenberg telephones his buddy Trump again, suggesting 737 MAX be
grounded after all.  FAA finally grounds all 737 MAX planes, through
Elwell issuing an FAA Emergency Order of Prohibition, making the
USA almost the last country in the world to take this obvious step.
Elweel's order claims there is 'new evidence' justifying the reversal.
(This is a lie.)

The US House of Representative Transportation Committee starts an
inquiry into why 737 MAX was certified with no requirement for
additional pilot training, given its substantial differences.

March 14, 2019:  An expose from Politico reveals that at least five 
pilots of 737 MAX craft had filed in FAA's incident database strongly
worded warnings with FAA about dangerous nose-down episodes.  One such
report, in November 2018, called it 'unconscionable' that Boeing, the
airlines, and the FAA had pilots flying these craft without training,
resources, and documentation to understand and manage the
attitude-control systems.  He called the Flight Manual 'inadequate and
almost criminally insufficient' on that subject.

Indonesian NTSB Deputy Chief Haryo Satmiko reveals that the doomed Lion
Air plane, on its immediately prior inbound flight, suffered an airspeed 
monitor fault that caused pilots to struggle to control the aircraft.
Passengers described the effect as like a rollercoaster.  Luckily, in 
that case, a third pilot was in the cockpit who was able to solve the
'stabiliser runaway' problem MCAS caused before the plane hit the
ground, by hitting the two required cutoff switches on the 737 MAX's
centre console and turning off MCAS for the remainder of the flight.

Taiwan and Japan ban 737 MAX flights from their airspace.

Garuda Indonesia cancels its order for 49 units.

March 15, 2019:  Ethiopian Airlines's CEO reveals the contents of the
cockpit voice-recorder black box.  The pilot had described having
'flight control problems' and got permission to return to Addis Ababa
Bole International Airport, but crashed soon after that.  A local 
worker who reviews air traffic communications says the plane had been
moving up and down by hundreds of feet at unusually high speed before it
crashed.  Satellite data confirms this happened to both flights.

Ethiopian Airlines stresses that its pilots were all aware of the MCAS 
anti-stall software, and received training on how to deal ith it.

Argentina joins the other nations in banning 737 MAX planes from its
airspace.

March 17, 2019:  US Dept. of Transportation (USDOT) begins an
investigation of FAA's 'type certification' of 737 MAX.

March 18, 2019:  After more than a week's silence, Boeing CEO Dennis
Muilenburg issues an open letter addressing the two crashes.  It says
Boeing will soon update MCAS and related pilot training to address
'concerns' raised by the two crashes.  The statement blames 'new
software, faulty AoA vane readings, and inadequate pilot training'.
This is one of many occasions when Boeing responds to the crisis by
trying to shift blame (falsely) onto claimed pilot error.

French investigators at BEA (Bureau d'Enquetes & d'Analyses) of the
Ethiopian crash release early findings, after reviewing black-box
data, stressing uncanny similarities to the Indonesian one including the
same oscillating trajectory, and critises in particular Boeing designing
MCAS to trigger if _either_ of the two AoA vanes signals too-high angle
of attack, making either one a catastrophic single point of failure
(SPoF).

(Notably, the USAF military variant of 737 MAX, the KC-46, uses data
from _both_ AoA vanes rather than one, averting the SPoF.)

Boeing hires NYC 'crisis communications' firm Sard Verbinnen to help
stop its PR debacle.  It also beefs up activity at its lobbying office
in Washington, where it already spends over $15 million a year, which is
more than all but a few other companies.

March 19, 2019:  USDOT requests that the Office of Inspector General
audit the 737 MAX certification process.   Congress and the FBI also 
announce investigations into the same process.

March 21, 2019:  Anonymous sources within Boeing reveal that two critical
safety features for 737 MAX, AoA Indicator and AoA Disagree light, were
missing from the two crashed planes _because_ they'd been available only
as very costly upsell 'extras'.

March 22, 2019:  Trump-appointed FAA Acting Administrator and ex-lobbyist 
Daniel Elwell testifies to the Senate's Aviation Subcommittee that MCAS
'is accounted for in the training' for 737 MAX pilots.  (This is either
a lie or incompetence.  Pick one.)  American Airlines senior Captain
Jason Goldberg then testifies, respectfully commenting that
Administrator Elwell's statement was incorrect.  Numerous other industry 
commentators also express surprise at Elwell's misstatement.

March 23, 2019:  Boeing hosts a meeting with about 200 pilots,
regulators, and and executives from five airlines in Renton, WA, vaguely
reassuring everyone of safety, reviewing proposed software changes,  and
promising better future communication.

March 25, 2019:  And explosive NY Times report suggests Boeing
compromised safety of the 737 MAX primarily because it was rushing to
avoid losing market share to Airbus.

March 27, 2019:  NY Times's reporting says commercial pilots recruited by 
Boeing to perform simulator re-creations of the Lion Air crash have
revealed more unexpected bad news:  Pilots show that there will often
not be adequate time for even well-prepared pilots to disengage MCAS
before crash.

Also on this day, Boeing VP of Engineering Mike Sinnett, chief project
engineer for the 737 program, briefs industry industy insiders and
observers at the Renton, WA assembly plant and reassures everyone
there's basically nothing wrong!  Happy ending!  All that's needed is 
additional pilot training (an additional 15-minute computer-based
course),  adding the previously detailed 'disagree light', patching the
firmware, and restoring the prior norm that applied for the previous 50
years of 737 operation where doing a 'yoke jerk' disables all automated
assists.

April, 2019:  Boeing amends its November 2018 statement to the American
Airlines pilots where it had claimed AoA Disagree would warn pilots of a
problem before even taking off, _now_ telling pilots AoA Disagree will in
fact not alert until an aircraft is 400 feet up, sorry about that.
(Later, they will be forced to further concede, that AoA Disagree
_doesn't work at all_ unless second extra-cost option 'AoA Indicator' is
also installed, and that they'd known this very damning fact since 2017.)

April 2, 2019:  The US Senate Commerce Committee starts an
investigation of FAA training of its inspectors.

April 4, 2019:  Ethiopia's transport minister, Dagmawit Moges, delivers
Ethiopia's preliminary report on the Ethiopian Airlines disaster, saying
that 'pilots performed all the procedures repeatedly provided by the
manufacturer but [were] not able to control the aircraft'.  Industry
commentators find that some of the steps the pilots took during their
six-minute struggle to save the plane were 'unusual', particularly their
leaving it at full takeoff power, but that pilots didn't violate
recommended procedures.  (The 737 MAX suffers a systemic 'pitch/power
coupling', where applying power makes it pitch up, and cutting it does
the reverse, so it's understandable that cutting power while struggling
to control pitch at low altitude would have seemed crazy and might have
made things worse.)

Also that day, Jon Ostrower, aviation columnist at 'The Air Current',
working with YouTube figure and commercial aviation trainer Mentour
Pilot, remind the world of 53-year-old training materials from the
737-200 (a stretch model of the original 737) dated February 1, 1982
covering the hazard of runaway vertical trim on a 737 and how to
recover by using a 'roller-coaster technique' of alternating up and down
movements so that manual trim is possible during the phase not putting
pressure against that correction.  This technique was dropped from 737 
manuals by the mid-1980s, but could have saved either 733 MAX plane
given adequate altitude to try it (as Ethiopian Air, trying to recover
at only 1000 feet elevation, did not, but Lion Air did).
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/vestigal-design-issue-clouds-737-max-crash-investigations/

Ostrower and Mentour Pilot confirm as closely as feasible using
Mentour Pilot's simulator that Boeing's documented recovery method for
the 737 MAX would fail if airspeed were high, because of adverse
aerodynamic forces.

Also on this day, Boeing finally admits that MCAS played a role in both
crashes.  (Thank you, Captain Obvious.)  It reiterates its promise of a
software update, and promises to improve cockpit displays and training
materials.

April 15, 2019:  And expose by Vox says Boeing deliberately downplayed the
existence and function of MCAS to customers, in order to protect the
false impression that the 737 MAX was a drop-in replacement for earlier
737 airframes needing little or no additional training.

April 22, 2019:  In other news, an NY Times report claims 'shoddy
production and weak oversight that have threatened to compromise safety'
have long been common at Boeing's Charleston, South Carolina plant that
produces the flagship 787 Dreamliner.  Boeing denies the report.

April 27, 2019:  Confidential sources reveal that four internal
whistleblowing employees at Boeing called in four separate safety-issue
hotline alerts on April 5, the day after Ethiopia's preliminary report, 
disclosing additional concealed problems with MCAS and the AoA vanes.
These include:  (1) Damage to the wiring from the AoA vanes to the
cockpit electronics, caused by an unknown foreign object, and (2)
concerns about the MCAS control cut-out switches.  No details or
comments are released, but Boeing promises to launch a new
investigation.

April 28, 2019:  News leaks out that Boeing failed to inform Southwest
Airlines, its biggest 738 MAX customer, that the 'AoA Disagree' safety
light was non-functional on all of its jets, because Southwest hadn't
also ordered the extra-cost AoA Indicator feature.  Southwest wasn't
informed of this fact until after the Lion Air crash.  Southwest
thereupon retroactively installed the AoA Indicator, permitting both
optional safety features to work for the very first time.

Boeing now claims that AoA Disagree will now be a standard feature going
forward, and that existing 737 MAX airframes may be retrofitted at no
cost, at airline request.

April 29, 2019:  Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg refuses at the annual
shareholder meeting to admit there is any problem with the 737 MAX's 
MCAS software.  (This is a lie.)  He also denies that Boeing ever makes
safety features optional (also a lie).  He also claimsinvestigators 
of the Ethiopian crash were mistaken and that pilots did not
'completely' follow emergency procedures (also a lie).

Muilenburg justifies Boeing having never informed pilots of MCAS's
existence in the 737 MAX by saying 'It's something that's designed to be
part of how the airplanes fly.  So,it's part of the certification
process.  It's not something that's a separate procedure or something
that needs to be trained on separately.  It's fundamentally embedded in
the handling qualities of the airplane.  So, when you train on the
airplane, you are being trained on MCAS.  It's not a separate system to
be trained on.'  He also denies the press's characterisation of MCAS as
an anti-stall system at all.

As context, Muilenburg is (successfully) facing down a shareholder
initiative to split the CEO and Board chairman roles, both of which he
currently holds.

May 6, 2019:  Boeing admits that it'd been aware of a flaw with the AoA
Disagree alert light (in which it silently failed to function) in 2017,
before either of the two crashes, but didn't disclose it to customers
and regulators until after the Lion Air crash.  Even then, in its
disclosure to FAA, Boeing's filing had claimed there was no safety risk
from the flaw.  And still now in mid-2019, Boeing still claims that a
non-working AoA Disagree indicator cannot affect airline safety or
operation because it is merely 'supplemental information'.

May 7, 2019:  FAA announces it's bringing in experts from NASA, USAF,
and USDOT as a Technical Advisory Board to help with review and
certification of Boeing's proposed software fex.  The planned software 
fix will for the first time make MCAS compare both AoA readings.  If AoA
vanes disagree by 5.5 degrees or more with flaps retracted (i.e.,
post-takeoff), MCAS won't activate, and an indicator on the flight-deck
display will alert the pilots.  If MCAS activates, it will do so only
once on each elevated-AoA event, and will never command more stabiliser
deflection than can be counteracted by the crew pulling back on the
control column.  Also, there will be training for the first time about
the differences between 737 MAX and 737NG.

Boeing meets with 737 MAX-operating airlines, the first of six such
sessions planned to cover the path to recertification.  Boeing promises
greater transparency.

Meanwhile, FAA is conducting a Joint Authorities Technical Review with
eight other countries and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA),
over the next three months to review the 737 MAX's original
certification, and EASA is running its own review of the entire 737 MAX
design, and will not allow flights until its probe completes.

May 15, 2019:  An audio recording emerges of the tense, angry November
2018 meeting between Boeing and a group of American Airlines pilots
representing the pilots' union, shortly after the Lion Air crash:  The
pilots said things like 'We flat-out deserve to know what's on our
airplanes', and 'These guys didn't even know the damned system was on
the airplane -- nor did anybody else.'

US Dept. of Justice is revealed to be carrying out a criminal probe of
Boeing's development and integration into fleets of the 737 MAX.  Grand
jury subpoenas have gone out to Boeing, Southwest, and United.
(Numerous victim families are also suing Boeing.)

FAA Acting Administrator Elwell defends FAA's certification process in
front of the US House of Representatives Transportation Committee, but
allows that Boeing had been derelict in not mentioning MCAS in 737 MAX
manuals.

May 19, 2019:  Boeing discloses that its flight training simulators for
the 737 MAX cannot reproduce the flying conditions that doomed the two
aircraft, or some other flight conditions that might be safety-critical.
In particular, the simulators cannot replicate the immense force
requirement for applying manual trim in an uncontrolled vertical
deflection incident that dramatically increases airspeed.

May 22, 2019:  Boeing claims it has a complete fix for 737 MAX's
software and training protocols, and releases them to airlines, pending
FAA approval.

May 27, 2019:  Ethiopian Airlines announces it intends to replace all
its 737 MAX planes with Airbus A320 units.

June 3, 2019:  Azerbaijan Airlines cancels its order of 10 units.

June 10, 2019:  The US airline pilot's union says American Airlines is
not allowing pilots use its 737 MAX simulator to see if the alleged fix
works.

June 11, 2019:  Muilenberg admits to people at the Paris Air Show that
Boeing made a 'mistake' in handling the non-operability of the AoA
Disagree light unless AoA Indicator is already installed, after
discovering said malfunction in 2017.  

June 17, 2019:  Boeing CFO Greg Smith, in an interview at the Paris Air
Show, says the firm is considering a Trump Twitter suggestion on April
15th to rename the 737 MAX to something else.  (Really.  Do you think I
could make this stuff up?)  

June 18, 2019:  You are here.